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Various traumatic experiences and post-traumatic stress disorder (PTSD) are
associated with biased attention toward trauma-related information. However, few
studies have exclusively investigated such biases in sexual victimization survivors or
identified factors that influence this relationship between sexual victimization and
biased attention. Using eyetracking methodology, the current study attempts to
delineate attentional patterns in sexually victimized and non-victimized undergraduate
women, using viewing of different emotional picture pairs. This study also aims to
assess the impact of PTSD symptomatology on the relationship between sexual
victimization and greater attentional bias. Finally, the study explores changes in
attention toward trauma-related stimuli among survivors by examining whether the
probability of fixation for the trauma-related (rape) picture varies as a function of time
and victimization history over the duration of a trial. A total of 142 undergraduate
women who reported sexual victimization history viewed trauma-related, negative,
and positive picture pairs for 5 seconds while their eye movements were recorded. No
evidence was found for attentional biases toward trauma-related pictures in survivors
with or without PTSD symptoms. However, survivors higher in PTSD symptoms
demonstrated a tendency to dwell less on positive pictures than those lower in PTSD
symptoms. Further, sexual victimization did not predict changes in fixations on

trauma-related stimuli over the course of trial duration. Implications of these results
are discussed in relation to methodological advantages of using eyetracking to assess
attentional biases, and potential targets of intervention for survivors with higher PTSD
symptomatology.

iv
Dedication
To my mother, for always believing in me and praying for me. Also, to my
clients, for inspiring me to just keep moving forward.

v
Acknowledgments
This dissertation would not have been possible without the love, support,
encouragement, and prayers from many and I would like to acknowledge the
enormous help given to me in completing this work. For his guidance and patience,
and his encouragement to set my priority on quality, I wish to thank my mentor, Dr.
David DiLillo. Also, special thanks to Dr. Kate Walsh, for involving me in the data
collection and lending me the data, and for always being an inspiration; Dr. Lesa
Hoffman, for the countless hours she assisted me with the data analyses, and for being
a fantastic teacher; Dr. David Hansen, for convincing me to attend UNL and for
always being so kind and encouraging; my other committee members, for their time,
efforts, and feedback; and Dr. Deborah Walsh, for helping me manage completing my
dissertation during an intense internship experience. And, as always, my appreciation
to my friends and family, for all they are to me. A special note of thanks to my
husband, for doing everything to make sure I keep a smile on my face at the end of
every day. Also, my dog, Kairo, for the joy he brings into my life.

vi
Table of Contents
Title Page…………………………………………………………………………….i
Abstract…………………………………..………………………………………….ii
Dedication…………………………………..……………………………………….iv
Acknowledgements……………………………..…………………………………...v
Table of Contents..…………………………………………………………………..vi
Chapter 1: Introduction………..…………………………………………………….1
Chapter 2: Method…………………………………………………………………..36
Chapter 3: Data Analyses…………………………………………………………...45
Chapter 4: Results…………………………………………………………………...53
Chapter 5: Discussion……………………………………………………………….92
Chapter 6: References……………………………………………………………....109
Appendix A: Informed Consent………………………………………………….....127
Appendix B: Questionnaires………………………………………………………..130
Appendix C: Examples of Emotional Picture Comparisons…………………….….141

1
Chapter 1: Introduction
Exposure to unwanted sexual experience during childhood or adolescence
(herein referred to as CSA) as well as in adulthood (herein referred to as ASA) is
unfortunately common. However, survivors respond to similar experiences in
remarkably diverse ways, thus underscoring the need for detection of resilience and
risk factors that can alter the trajectory of recovery. An emergent body of research
suggests that sexual victimization may be associated with biases in survivors’ attention
to trauma-related emotional information (e.g., Fani, Bradley-Davino, Ressler, &
McClure-Tone, 2010; Pineles, Shipherd, Mostoufi, Abramovitz, & Yovel, 2009).
Understanding these biases has relevance for survivors given that attention is an
important and precursory component of emotion regulation (Gross, 1998; Wadlinger
& Isaacowitz, 2008), a pivotal process that underlies negative psychological sequelae
following sexual victimization experience (Walsh, 2009). Little empirical research,
however, has examined the specific nature and degree of attentional biases among
sexual victimization survivors. Even less is known about factors that may create and
maintain such biases in survivors.
A number of recent studies suggest that post-traumatic stress disorder (PTSD)
symptomatology may constitute one explanatory mechanism that exerts influence over
trauma survivors’ attentional deployment in response to salient emotional stimuli.
Indeed, a substantial line of research within the anxiety literature has linked PTSD and
attentional biases in survivors of various types of trauma (for reviews, see Aupperle,
Melrose, Stein, & Paulus, 2011; Vasterling & Brailey, 2005;
Williams, Watts, MacLeod, & Mathews, 1997). For example, studies have
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documented that patients with PTSD symptoms display attentional bias toward
trauma-related stimuli subsequent to their trauma experience (Bryant & Harvey, 1995;
Foa, Feske, Murdock, Kozak, & McCarthy, 1991; McNally, Kaspi, Riemann, &
Zeitlin, 1990). Theoretical support for this finding comes from emotion processing
theory of PTSD (Foa & Kozak, 1985, 1986) that conceptualizes attentional bias to
trauma-related stimuli as a significant factor in the development and maintenance of
PTSD following trauma exposure. Pursuant to such findings, a novel program of
research has evolved that investigates attentional bias modification as a treatment for
anxiety disorders, including PTSD, based on the assumptions that higher levels of
symptoms may be associated with greater attentional biases to salient emotional
stimuli and modifying these biases may effectively reduce pathological symptoms in
patients (for a review, see Bar-Haim, 2010).
Despite findings that sexually victimized individuals have one of the highest
rates of lifetime PTSD (Breslau, Kessler, Chilcoat, Schultz, Davis, & Andreski, 1998),
much of the research within the PTSD literature have examined attentional biases in
the context of traumas other than sexual victimization, such as combat exposure.
Nevertheless, it is likely that PTSD severity and symptom presentation vary by the
type of traumatic event endured (Kelley, Weathers, McDevitt-Murphy, Eakin, &
Flood, 2009) and may differentially influence trauma survivors’ attention and require
different treatment approaches. Thus, it is important to examine the unique impact of
PTSD symptomatology on sexual victimization survivors’ emotional attentional
processing.
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The present study therefore investigates attentional biases to emotional stimuli
in a sample of undergraduate women reporting sexual victimization experiences. This
study extends prior work by comparing women reporting a history of sexual
victimization versus no sexual victimization to determine whether such a history is
associated with unique visual attentional biases in response to pairs of trauma-related
(i.e., depicting sexual victimization) and non-trauma (i.e., positive and general
negative) pictures. This study also aims to determine whether sexual victimization is
related to attentional biases in the context of PTSD symptomatology or whether these
biases are solely a consequence of sexual victimization experience alone. This
investigation therefore examines the association between PTSD symptoms and
attentional biases in sexually victimized women, by assessing whether greater
attentional bias was associated with higher levels of PTSD symptomatology (i.e., total
symptom severity and distinct PTSD symptom clusters) among survivors. Finally, the
study also assesses whether participants show changes in fixations on trauma-related
stimuli over the course of trial duration that may be indicative of participants’
manipulation of their attention, perhaps as a way to regulate their emotions. Finally,
this study also examines whether sexual victimization history predicts these changes in
fixations across trial duration.
To provide a framework for the present study, relevant theoretical perspectives
and available empirical evidence that suggest predictions regarding the associations of
visual attentional biases with sexual victimization are first summarized. Additionally,
this section integrates available findings regarding the role of PTSD symptomatology
in survivors’ attentional biases. The second section summarizes gaps in the current
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literature to provide support for the proposed associations in the current study. The
final section provides specific aims and hypotheses for the present study.
Sexual Victimization and Attentional Biases to Emotional Information
Sexual victimization experiences are all too common. Data from studies using
nationally representative samples suggest that approximately 6% of children report
sexual abuse within the previous year (Briere & Elliot, 2003; Finkelhor, Turner,
Ormrod, & Hamby, 2009) and approximately 22% of adult women report sexual
victimization experiences after eighteen years of age (Elliot, Mok, & Briere, 2004). A
multitude of deleterious psychological and behavioral outcomes may arise from these
experiences, which include, but are not limited to, PTSD, depression, substance abuse,
self-destructive behaviors, and sexual revictimization (e.g., Elliot et al.; Maker,
Kemmelmeier, & Peterson, 2001; Paolucci, Genuis, Violato, 2001; Putnam, 2003;
Tyler, 2002). The effects are, in general, more harmful when one experiences
revictimization (i.e., multiple experiences of sexual victimization occurring in
childhood and adulthood), indicating that the effects of sexual victimization may be
cumulative (Messman-Moore, Long, & Siegfried, 2000). However, extensive work in
this area suggests that survivors vary in their adjustment following sexual
victimization. In fact, some do not develop any negative outcomes and may resume
their functioning naturally (Molnar, Buka, Kessler, 2001). For instance, Wright,
Fopma-Loy, and Fischer (2005) found that female CSA survivors showed
considerable discrepancies in how adequately they functioned across intrapersonal,
interpersonal, and intrafamilial domains, and approximately 82% of the women in
their study evidenced positive adaptation in at least one domain of functioning.

5
Therefore, identifying factors that explain this diverse and complex clinical picture in
survivors following sexual victimization is of critical importance.
As noted, one such explanatory mechanism that may have relevance to sexual
victimization comprises attentional bias to emotional information. In humans,
attention acts as the gateway to several important cognitive processes such as memory
and learning that form the necessary building blocks to subsequent successful
functioning and development (Shechner et al., 2012). Indeed, because of limited
cognitive resources, attention provides a way for dedicated perceptual processing by
prioritizing the multitude of environmental in order to focus on those most relevant in
the moment. For instance, attention can be captured involuntarily so that it alerts
cognition to important events in the environment. Furthermore, attention provides a
way for cognition to control perception and emotions by strategically switching focus
from one stimulus to another (Hill, 1999). With traumatic experiences such as sexual
victimization, certain emotional stimuli, particularly those related to the trauma, tend
to hold high salience to survivors, thereby demanding greater attention and available
cognitive capacities. While this may facilitate survival in the face of real danger, in the
absence of actual danger, selective attention to trauma-related stimuli may disrupt and
bias survivors’ attentional deployment. In addition to preferentially attending to
trauma-related stimuli to the exclusion of all other information (including corrective
information), survivors may also experience difficulties inhibiting responses to and
disengaging from trauma-related stimuli (Aupperle et al., 2011).
Theoretical writings within the child and adult literatures elucidate how these
attentional biases develop in sexual victimization survivors. For example, Pollak’s
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(2003) experience-dependent affective learning model illustrates the contribution of
childhood victimization to biased attentional processing of emotional information.
According to this theory, children are biologically prepared for attending to and
learning about emotions from salient events in their environment. However, they
possess limited processing capacities due to maturational constraints on their sensory
and perceptual systems, which therefore necessitate selective filtering of information
they attend to or process from their environment. As a result, victimized children may
selectively attend to and process relevant aspects of external information that are
central to their aversive experiences. In particular, they may be more prone to attend to
emotional cues that resemble their victimization experiences and suggest threat or
harm. These biased attentional patterns, in turn, may make child survivors less
effective at processing victimization-related threat cues, noticing other important cues,
and shifting attention to positive cues to manage their distress (Pollak). Although
Pollak’s model is based on ongoing research with physically abused children, many of
the same processes suggested may be applicable to children with experiences of CSA.
Emotion processing theories further illuminate how attentional biases evolve
following traumatic events like sexual victimization. For example, Foa and Kozak’s
(1985, 1986) emotion processing theory proposes that, subsequent to trauma exposure,
survivors develop adaptive or maladaptive fear structures with representations unique
to their trauma experiences, including the fear-invoking situation, their responses in
the situation, and subjective meaning of the situation and responses. Although normal
or adaptive fear structures include realistic and accurate perceptions of threat that then
generate appropriate physiological and behavioral responses, pathological or
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maladaptive fear structures emerge when one’s perceptions of threat and responses are
faulty (i.e., in the absence of an actual danger) or exaggerated (Foa, Huppert, & Cahill,
2006). Because of personal relevance, survivors readily attend to a wide range of
trauma-related stimuli in the environment, some of which may accurately signal
danger while others represent safe situations or visual stimuli that vaguely resemble
the original trauma. When survivors’ maladaptive fear structures are triggered by these
stimuli, they may experience increased physiological arousal and fail to utilize
accurate information from prior learning or consider the context of perceived threat.
Consequently, survivors may engage in faulty appraisals of even safe cues as
dangerous and respond in accordance with their fear (Foa & Kozak, 1986).
Specifically, attentional biases to trauma-related stimuli may become maladaptive
when survivors excessively and solely attend to such stimuli, experience lack of
flexibility using attention, and eventually resort to maladaptive behaviors such as
avoidance or numbing in their effort to cope with their negative emotions (Foa et al.,
2006). Survivors with significant posttraumatic distress may therefore display greater
disruptions in attention to triggers of trauma. These attentional biases, when repeated,
may become habitual pathological ways of processing trauma-related information and
result in several psychological problems.
Extensive research on attentional biases among individuals with anxiety
disorders, including PTSD, provides clues to possible attentional biases (Bar-Haim,
Lamy, Pergamin, Bakermans-Kranenburg, & van Ijzendoorn, 2007; Mogg & Bradley,
1998; Pollak, 2003). For instance, individuals with anxiety symptoms have
demonstrated a tendency to initially selectively attend to emotionally-salient stimuli
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and subsequently exhibit lack of flexibility using attention when processing such
stimuli within their environment. Specifically, three forms of biases have been
identified in anxious individuals: (a) faster detection of or orientation toward
threatening stimuli (facilitated attention); (b) prolonged engagement with or
difficulties shifting attention from threatening stimuli (delayed disengagement), and;
(c) allocation of attention toward locations opposite to the locations of threatening
stimuli (attentional avoidance) (for a review, see Cisler & Koster, 2010). These
findings further suggest that there may be differences in the expression of attentional
biases across different stages of information processing. Specifically, anxious
individuals may display facilitated attention and initial engagement at early stages of
visual processing, which is followed by delayed disengagement and attentional
avoidance in later, mostly strategic processing stages (Cisler & Koster; Mogg,
Bradley, de Bono, & Painter, 1997).
Although these attentional biases are observed among survivors of various
traumas, few studies have explored whether sexual victimization survivors manifest
unique attentional patterns. Nevertheless, this is an important question to be answered,
given that the ability to regulate attention toward salient emotional information may
have significant consequences for sexual victimization survivors’ adaptive
functioning. Over the past decade, a number of studies have identified these biases in
emotional attentional deployment as a proximal process that is involved in the onset
and maintenance of psychopathologies such as anxiety and depression (e.g., Aupperle
et al., 2011; Browning, Holmes, & Harmer, 2010). Attentional biases may constitute
an underlying risk factor for emotional disorders through its negative effects on the
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succeeding process of emotion regulation. Under ordinary circumstances, attentional
deployment is an important preliminary component of emotion regulation (Gross,
1998) whereby people modulate their attention in a given situation to alter their
emotional states (Gross & Thompson, 2007). This process of emotion regulation,
however, is disrupted in many sexual victimization survivors (Marx, Heidt, & Gold,
2005; Messman-Moore, Walsh, & DiLillo, 2010; Shields & Cicchetti, 1998, 2001;
Shipman & Zeman, 2001; Walsh, DiLillo, & Scalora, 2011). While people typically
exert considerable control over their abilities to focus and flexibly shift attention in
order to manage their emotions over time (MacLeod, Rutherford, Campbell,
Ebsworthy, & Holker, 2002; Rueda, Posner, & Rothbart, 2004), these attentional
processes may become biased as a result of sexual victimization experiences and
compromise survivors’ emotional responses to reminders of their trauma (Shipman &
Zeman, 2001; Williams, Mathews, & MacLeod, 1996). For instance, sexually
victimized individuals may preferentially attend to trauma-related stimuli and
subsequently have trouble disengaging from such stimuli (Foa et al., 2006). These
attentional patterns may increase the likelihood that they ruminate on such
experiences, appraise these stimuli as much more threatening, and fail to use effective
coping strategies, all of which consequently escalate their negative emotions
(Derryberry & Reed, 2002) and produce or exacerbate negative psychological
sequelae. One of the psychological outcomes after sexual victimization that has been
investigated most is PTSD. As will be discussed below, the different attentional biases
may closely parallel the symptoms of PTSD and play a role in the maintenance of the
disorder.
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PTSD Symptoms as a Predictor of Attentional Biases in Sexual Victimization
Survivors
PTSD is one of the most prevalent psychological problems associated with
sexual victimization (Kendall-Tackett et al., 1993; Kessler, Sonnega, Bromet, Hughes,
& Nelson, 1995; Molnar et al., 2001; Surís, Lind, Kashner, Borman, & Petty, 2004).
According to the Diagnostic and Statistical Manual of Mental Disorders-Fourth
Edition, Text Revision (DSM-IV-TR; American Psychiatric Association, 2000)1,
PTSD encompasses several cognitive, emotional, and behavioral symptoms following
exposure to a wide range of stressors, including any event that satisfies Criterion A
definition of a trauma, that lead to impaired functioning in at least one important life
domain. Survivors may report varying levels of the following clusters of symptoms:
(a) persistent re-experiencing of the traumatic event (Criterion B); (b) recurrent
avoidance of trauma-related stimuli and emotional numbing (Criterion C); and (c)
persistent hyperarousal symptoms (Criterion D).
Maladaptive attentional patterns to salient emotional cues are also at the core
of PTSD (Ehlers & Clark, 2000; Vasterling, Brailey, Constans, & Sutker, 1998).
Building on the concepts from emotion processing theory and incorporating
neuropsychological empirical evidence, Aupperle et al. (2011) proposed a model to
explicate how attentional biases to trauma-related information may contribute to and
maintain the clinical symptom presentation of PTSD. According to these authors,
following a traumatic event, trauma-related stimuli become highly salient and demand
_______________________
1

The fifth edition of the American Psychiatric Association’s Diagnostic and Statistical Manual of
Mental Disorders (DSM-5) was not published at the time of data collection.
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greater attentional resources from most, if not all, survivors, which may be revealed as
increased attention toward trauma-related stimuli (i.e., selective or facilitated
attention). However, Aupperle et al.’s model suggests that, due to subtle impairments
in executive functioning, some of these survivors may experience difficulties
inhibiting automatic responses and disengaging attention from trauma-related stimuli.
That is, these individuals may fail to determine whether an environmental stimulus (in
particular, trauma-related stimulus) is irrelevant or distracting to their current goals
and fail to disengage from it to orient toward goal-relevant stimuli. These difficulties
in disengaging from trauma-related stimuli, in turn, may be evidenced as pervasive
symptoms of hyperarousal, hypervigilance, irritability, intrusive memories, difficulty
concentrating, and diminished interest in activities. When their attempts to inhibit or
disengage from trauma-related stimuli fail, they may alternatively, but ineffectively,
resort to avoiding attention to any emotional triggers (Aupperle et al.). Persistent
avoidance of traumatic reminders may reduce survivors’ experience of rewarding
aspects of life and contribute to emotional numbness and depressive symptoms (Foa &
Kozak, 1986). In essence, Aupperle et al. summarize that the different attentional
biases of facilitated attention, difficulty with disengagement, and attentional avoidance
may be specifically related to the different symptom clusters of PTSD, thereby
contributing to the development and maintenance of PTSD.
A substantial empirical literature has linked attentional bias to PTSD
symptomatology (for reviews, see Aupperle et al., 2011; Bryant & Harvey, 1995;
Buckley, Blanchard, & Neill, 2000; Shipherd & Salters-Pedneault, 2008). However,
the majority of this empirical evidence has evolved from studies of population
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exposed to traumas such as combat and motor vehicle accidents (e.g., Bryant &
Harvey; Kimble, Fleming, Bandy, Kim, & Zambetti, 2010). Few studies have
examined whether the presence of PTSD symptoms matter for emotional attentional
biases among sexual victimization survivors using strong methodologies. The
following section provides an overview of the existing empirical support for the
association between sexual victimization and attentional biases to salient, traumarelated stimuli, and these findings additionally highlight the need for exploration of
PTSD symptoms as a factor that might predict attentional biases among sexual
victimization survivors.
Empirical Support for Visual Attentional Biases in Sexual Victimization
Survivors
Visual attentional biases in childhood victimization survivors. There is
mounting empirical evidence derived from studies among children and adults with
varied childhood victimization histories, including CSA, that have linked attentional
biases .with traumas such as early sexual victimization and PTSD symptoms may
predict the observed disruptions in attentional deployment.
In a study of sexually victimized girls (aged 11-17 years) with and without a
current diagnosis of PTSD, Freeman and Beck (2000) assessed participants’
attentional biases using a Stroop task (Stroop, 1935). The Stroop task was modified to
include words related to sexual trauma (e.g., kissing), developmentally relevant words
(e.g., shame), general threat words (e.g., cancer), positive words (e.g., enjoy), and
neutral words (e.g., sofa) as stimuli, each of which was presented for 1500
milliseconds (ms). Attentional bias on the Stroop task was inferred from cognitive
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interference when participants showed longer response latencies (i.e., greater
interference) to color-naming trauma-related words than other words, a pattern
supposedly due to automatic activation of trauma-related semantic and affective
representations (Weber, 2008) or fear structures. Results indicated that survivors with
a PTSD diagnosis were slower in color naming all words regardless of content, as
compared to the non-victimized and nonclinical control group, indicating that
survivors with PTSD showed cognitive interference for all words (and not only
trauma-related words). Survivors without a PTSD diagnosis, however, did not differ
from either the PTSD group or control group. Further, both survivors and nonvictimized control participants exhibited longer response latencies in color naming
trauma-related words (i.e., greater attentional interference) compared to other word
types. The authors attributed this unexpected finding to the “tabooed” nature of
trauma-related words (e.g., penis) and to the potential emotional relevance of sexuality
for adolescents that may have primed all adolescents in the study to think about sexual
trauma-related words. These findings imply that attentional processing patterns in
sexually victimized adolescent girls with PTSD may not be necessarily trauma-related
and that other cognitive processing deficits may prevail in this population as noted by
their delayed overall color naming.
Other studies using a similar methodology, however, have found that sexual
victimization survivors with PTSD exhibit unique attentional patterns to traumarelated stimuli. For example, in a more recent study using a modified Stroop task,
including trauma-related words, intimacy words, and neutral words, Martinson,
Sigmon, Craner, Rothstein, and McGillicuddy (2013) found that men and women with
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a history of sexual victimization in childhood and/or adulthood, particularly those with
a current diagnosis of PTSD, displayed longer color naming latencies for traumarelated and intimacy words compared to survivors without PTSD and non-victimized
control group (following an unspecified time of stimulus presentation). Thus,
emotionally-salient word stimuli influenced attentional processing in survivors with
PTSD. However, survivors without PTSD did not differ from the non-victimized
control group, suggesting that presence of PTSD may be crucial for attentional
processing of emotional material rather than a sexual victimization history alone.
While these studies provide initial evidence for attentional biases in sexual
victimization survivors, particularly for those with current PTSD, there are limitations
of this work due to the methodology used. Specifically, doubts have been raised about
findings using the modified Stroop task given that it provides ambiguous evidence for
attentional bias to trauma-related words at best (Williams, Mathews, & MacLeod,
1996). For example, investigators have observed similar degree of interference not
only for trauma-related words, but also for affectively different words such as positive
words (e.g., McNally, Riemann, Louro, Lukach, & Kim, 1992). Moreover, there is no
consensus about interpreting the Stroop interference in that longer color naming
latencies to trauma-related words in survivors can be interpreted not only as facilitated
attention to these words but also as delayed responding to these words (Cisler &
Koster, 2010). Furthermore, factors other than facilitated attention may affect
performance on Stroop task such as anxiety elicited by the words or rumination over
word meaning, but these cannot be delineated using this method (Cisler & Koster).
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The visual dot-probe (MacLeod, Mathews, & Tata, 1986) is another paradigm
that attempts to overcome some of the problems with the modified Stroop task. Unlike
the Stroop task, the dot-probe is a more direct measure of attentional bias that does not
rely on interference on a secondary task (e.g., color naming) to measure biases in
attentional deployment and instead allows for examination of direction of these biases
(i.e., toward or away from threat). In this task, participants are shown pairs of
emotional stimuli, and each pair is followed by a probe (e.g., an asterisk) that replaced
the location of one of the stimulus in the pair. Participants are then instructed to press
a button to indicate which of the two stimuli in the pair was replaced by the probe.
Attention bias scores were calculated by subtracting the mean reaction time on trials
where the probe replaced the location of an emotional stimulus (valid trials) from trials
where the probe replaced the location of a neutral stimulus (invalid trials), with
positive bias scores implying selective attention to emotional stimulus and negative
scores implying attentional avoidance of emotional stimulus. Thus, dot-probe allows
for assessment of spatial attentional allocation by examining the impact of emotional
stimuli on the relative probe-detection latencies in two spatial areas (Cisler & Koster,
2010).
Using this paradigm, Pine and colleagues (2005) studied attentional biases in
male and female children (aged 7-13 years) with sexual abuse, physical abuse, and/or
neglect experiences. Participants saw photographs of happy, angry, and neutral face
pairs for 500 ms followed by an asterisk that replaced the location of one of the faces
in the pair. These researchers found that, compared to non-victimized children and
children with minimal history of physical abuse, severely physically abused children
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showed an attentional bias such that they tended to avoid angry faces. Physically
abused children did not show any attentional bias to happy faces. Further, greater
severity of physical abuse and a current PTSD diagnosis were each associated with
increased attentional avoidance of angry faces. However, because those with greater
abuse (physical/sexual/neglect) severity also had higher rates of PTSD, the degree to
which attentional bias relates to abuse severity (independent of PTSD) as opposed to
PTSD, remains unclear. A major limitation of this study is that data analysis did not
take into consideration that many of the physically abused children in the sample also
experienced other victimization experiences such as severe sexual abuse and neglect.
Therefore, the conclusions that can be drawn from these findings are limited regarding
whether and how each type of victimization uniquely contributes to attentional biases
to relevant emotional information.
Two studies of adult survivors of childhood victimization utilized the dotprobe method as well. Gibb, Schofield, and Coles (2009) examined attentional biases
among undergraduate men and women with and without exposure to moderate to
severe levels of sexual, physical, and/or emotional abuse in childhood. Participants
viewed photographs of emotional (angry, sad, and happy) and neutral face pairs, with
each emotional-neutral pair presented for 1000 ms. Contrary to Pine et al.’s finding,
participants who reported a history of victimization, including CSA, displayed
selective attention toward angry, but not happy or sad faces. Further, abused
individuals exhibited a nonsignificant trend toward attentional avoidance of happy
faces (p = .08), suggesting that early victimization may also be related to biased
processing of other emotional stimuli in adulthood. Although both Pine et al. (2005)
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and Gibb et al. utilized similar methodology to assess attentional bias, both differed on
the presentation time of stimuli (500 ms vs. 1000 ms), which may mean that
conclusions were drawn based on the type of attentional bias that was evident at the
time of stimulus presentation. They also differed on sample characteristics such as the
type(s) of abuse endured and developmental age of participants at the time of the study
(children vs. adults), both of which may have relevance for emotional attentional
processing (Pollak, Cicchetti, Hornung, & Reed, 2000). Furthermore, both studies did
not adequately control for participants’ PTSD symptoms, a matter that precludes
conclusive statements on the unique contribution of early victimization to attentional
biases.
Fani and colleagues (2010) extended Gibb et al.’s findings in a primarily
African American sample consisting of men and women with or without a history of
childhood victimization (sexual, physical, and/or emotional abuse) from a community
sample. Survivors’ PTSD symptoms were also assessed. Participants viewed
photographs of emotional (threatening or happy) and neutral face pairs in addition to
neutral face pairs for 500 ms each. Interestingly, all victimization types were
significantly associated with attentional bias toward happy faces, but not threatening
or neutral faces. This finding held true even after controlling for the effects of different
adult traumatic incidents, suggesting the unique association between early
victimization experiences such as CSA and subsequent attentional biases in adulthood.
Finally, attentional bias toward happy faces was independently associated with
childhood victimization and PTSD symptoms of numbing and avoidance in adulthood
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and there were no mediational relationships between these factors as the authors
predicted.
Although these visual dot-probe studies offer some evidence linking childhood
victimization experiences, including CSA, to unique attentional patterns to (i.e.,
attention toward or away from) different emotional information, like the Stroop task,
the dot-probe method also has limitations. For example, this task does not adequately
distinguish whether faster responses on valid trials (i.e., when the probe appears in the
same location as the angry face) are a result of facilitated attention to angry faces, or
difficulties switching attention away from (or prolonged engagement on) the angry
face even after it disappeared (Bar-Haim et al., 2007). Further, similar to the Stroop,
the dot-probe provides only information about attentional biases at one point in time
and does not capture the pattern of attentional allocation over time (Hermans,
Vansteenwegen, & Eelen, 1999). These methods present only a snapshot view of
attentional bias depending on the presentation time of the stimuli, which does not
allow assessment of the different attentional patterns across an entire stimulus trial.
In another study among physically abused, primarily African American,
children (aged 8-11 years), Pollak and Tolley-Schell (2003) used a different method—
a spatial cueing task (Fox, Russo, & Dutton, 2002)—to assess attentional biases. In the
cueing task, participants were presented with photographs of an emotional (happy or
angry faces) or neutral cue in one of the two rectangles for 500 ms followed by display
of a neutral target stimulus (e.g., star) in the same (valid trials) or opposite (invalid
trials) location where the cue had appeared. Participants then indicated the rectangle in
which the target appeared by pressing a key. Faster responses for the target in valid
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trials where the cue draws attention to the rectangle with the target stimuli reflect
increased attention (i.e., facilitated attention) to cued stimuli and slower responses to
invalid trials where the cue draws attention away from the target-rectangle imply
prolonged attentional engagement on cued stimuli. Findings indicated that physical
abuse severity predicted faster orientation toward and prolonged processing of angry
faces (i.e., delayed disengagement), but not happy faces.
Other studies indicate that victimized children also show heightened sensitivity
to and faster detection of visual stimuli eliciting other negative emotions such as fear
(e.g., Masten et al., 2008). Using a morphed facial emotion identification paradigm
with happy, neutral, and fearful faces in children with different victimization
experiences (physical abuse, sexual abuse, emotional abuse, neglect, and/or exposure
to domestic violence), Masten and colleagues found that, compared to non-victimized
children, victimized children more quickly identified emotional facial expressions,
particularly fearful faces. Three-fourths of the victimized children had a definite or
probable PTSD diagnosis. Although insufficient power may have precluded detection
of differences, an exploratory analysis between maltreated children with and without
PTSD indicated that children with severe maltreatment experiences in general
exhibited faster detection of fearful faces and the presence of PTSD diagnosis did not
affect this finding.
Summary and critique. The empirical evidence on the topic of childhood
victimization and visual attentional biases is rather mixed. Results of the
aforementioned studies suggest that many individuals with experiences of childhood
victimization such as CSA do show an attentional bias toward threatening stimuli
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(Gibb et al., 2009), but others show a bias away from threatening stimuli (Pine et al.,
2005), and still others show a bias toward positive stimuli (Fani et al., 2010). The two
studies that investigated attentional biases among early sexual victimization survivors
(Freeman & Beck, 2000; Martinson et al., 2013) yielded mixed findings as well, such
that while adolescent female survivors with PTSD did not exhibit increased Stroop
interference for trauma-related words, adult male and female survivors with PTSD
displayed increased Stroop interference such stimuli, compared to survivors without
PTSD and nonvictims.
One major question arising from these studies concerns the nature of
attentional bias. Specifically, it is unclear whether survivors manifest biased attention
exclusively for threatening trauma-related information, or if it is directed also toward
other affectively different information such as positive stimuli in their environment.
Moreover, there is lack of clarity regarding the direction of attentional bias for (i.e.,
toward or away from) different types of emotional information. Methodological
differences may explain the divergence in these findings. For example, these studies
use differing methodologies (e.g., Stroop, dot-probe, and spatial cueing). Moreover,
regardless of the methods employed, none can adequately delineate the different types
of attentional biases; in fact, some methods used are of questionable validity in
assessing attentional bias (e.g., modified Stroop task). Prior work also differed in the
threatening stimuli used (e.g., trauma-related words, angry faces, fear faces) and in the
duration of stimulus presentation, which limits drawing general conclusions. Further,
many of these studies combined different victimization types (e.g., sexual abuse,
physical abuse, emotional abuse, and neglect), and did not delineate unique effects of
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different victimization types on attentional biases. They also did not accordingly
choose trauma-specific stimuli that are potentially perceived as threatening by
different survivors. Participant diversity in terms of ethnicity, gender, and
developmental age of survivor at the time of the study (i.e., adolescents versus adults),
was also noted across studies. In some studies among adult survivors of childhood
victimization (e.g., Gibb et al., 2009; Martinson et al., 2013), the presence and effect
of adulthood victimization were not considered. Finally, there is little consensus about
the effect of PTSD, with some studies showing greater attentional biases among
survivors with PTSD (Martinson et al.; Pine et al., 2005), but some showing no
differences among survivors with regard to their PTSD (Freeman & Beck, 2000;
Masten et al., 2008), and yet others who did not assess for PTSD (Gibb et al.).
In summary, these data do not directly provide answers regarding the relation
between early exposure to sexual victimization and emotional attentional biases, and
the effect of survivors’ PTSD symptoms on their attentional deployment for salient
emotional information. However, they raise several important questions and areas of
exploration regarding the relation between CSA, PTSD symptomatology, and
attentional biases for future research, some of which will be examined in the current
study.
Visual attentional biases in adult sexual victimization survivors. Not only
are sexual victimization experiences prevalent in childhood, they are also common in
adulthood, and a few studies have explored attentional bias among survivors of adult
sexual victimization (ASA; occurring after eighteen years of age). Foa and colleagues
(1991) used a modified Stroop task to investigate attentional biases among adult
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female sexual victimization survivors with and without PTSD diagnosis and nonvictimized control participants. The stimuli included trauma-related threat words,
general threat words, neutral/fruit words, and non-words, each presented for 1000 ms.
Rape survivors with PTSD showed longer response latencies to color name traumarelated threat words than other words, whereas the comparison groups (including rape
survivors without PTSD) did not show Stroop interference for any word types. Foa et
al. concluded that attentional biases reflected in Stroop interference to trauma-related
threat words were typical of survivors’ PTSD psychopathology rather than mere
exposure to sexual victimization.
Comparable results were obtained in a study of mostly adult female sexual
victimization survivors with and without PTSD as well as non-victimized control
participants who completed a modified Stroop task for high threat (i.e., traumarelated), moderate threat (e.g., “crime”), positive (e.g., “loyal”), and neutral (e.g.,
“typical”) words, each presented for 1500 ms (Cassiday, McNally, & Zeitlin, 1992).
Similar to Foa et al. (1991), these researchers found that survivors with PTSD showed
longer response latencies to color name all word types, with greatest interference
observed for high threat or trauma-related threat words, followed by moderate threat,
positive, and neutral words, in that order. Unlike Foa et al.’s findings, survivors who
did not have a current diagnosis of PTSD also exhibited Stroop interference for
trauma-related threat words, albeit to a lesser extent than what those with PTSD
showed. This study also found that survivors’ interference for trauma-related threat
words was associated with self-reported symptoms of intrusive symptoms but not
avoidance or numbing symptoms on the Impact of Events Scale. The authors posited
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that greater interference among survivors without PTSD compared to controls resulted
from the presence of high levels of anxiety (fear of negative evaluation), depression,
and avoidance or psychic numbing symptoms in the rape-only group. They also
suggested that this finding might have resulted from the fact that most of the rape-only
survivors had a past diagnosis of PTSD but had not received effective treatment (and
as a result may continue to experience PTSD symptoms), whereas Foa et al.’s study
used recovered rape survivors for their rape-only group. Together, Cassiday et al.
summarized that survivors with PTSD show biased attention to all emotional words,
but particularly to trauma-related threat words, and survivors without a PTSD
diagnosis showed similar interference, but to a lesser extent than those with current
PTSD did.
In a recent study, Pineles et al. (2009) used a visual search paradigm in which
female sexual victimization survivors with high and low PTSD symptoms were
instructed to identify a discrepant target amongst an array of identical stimuli.
Participants were classified into the two PTSD groups based on their responses to
PTSD Checklist (Weathers, Litz, Herman, Huska, & Keane, 1993) anchored to an
unwanted sexual experience that bothered them the most at the time of assessment.
The stimuli in the visual search task included trauma-related words (e.g., “rape”),
general threat words (e.g., “anxiety”), semantically related neutral words (fruits), and
uncategorized neutral words (e.g., “cotton”), and non-words. Although high PTSD
survivors did not evidence selective attention to trauma-related words, they
demonstrated greater difficulties disengaging their attention specifically from traumarelated words, which interfered with their performance on visual search task.
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Conversely, survivors low in PTSD did not show any difference in responding to trials
with trauma-related words compared to trials with other word types. Because the
PTSD symptoms were assessed in relation to the most bothersome sexual experience,
it is not known in which participants the symptoms were related to CSA, ASA, or
both. Importantly, the lack of a non-victimized control group precludes any definitive
conclusions to be drawn regarding the impact of ASA and PTSD on attentional biases.
Summary and critique. Although relatively few studies have explored
attentional biases among ASA survivors, findings from the existing work do suggest
that sexual victimization in adulthood predicts biased attentional processing toward
trauma-related stimuli. Moreover, this link appears to be more pronounced in
survivors with high PTSD symptoms or a PTSD diagnosis. However, there are
methodological differences across these studies. For instance, all three studies differed
in the attentional task used to capture the biases. While the two studies (Cassiday et
al., 1992; Foa et al., 1991) that utilized Stroop task do not assist with clarifying the
nature of attentional bias observed among ASA participants, Pineles et al.’s study
(2010) using a visual search task provides preliminary evidence that attentional biases
in sexual victimization survivors may be characterized by difficulty disengaging from
trauma-related stimuli rather than facilitated attention to such stimuli. However, these
studies did not assess for CSA among ASA survivors, raising the critical question
regarding the cumulative impact of sexual victimization in childhood and adulthood
on attentional biases in adulthood. Data from this work, however, suggest that
exposure to ASA as well as high PTSD symptom levels may be related to the
differences in the exhibition of attentional bias. Considering the therapeutic and
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research implications of this conclusion, the present study attempts to explore these
relations using an advanced methodology.
Visual attentional biases and revictimization. In the one study to date that
examined the cumulative impact of CSA and ASA on emotional attentional biases,
Field and colleagues (2001) administered the modified Stroop color-naming task to
treatment-seeking women recruited from the community with one of the two different
victimization histories—those with only CSA experiences and CSA survivors who had
been sexually revictimized during six months prior to the beginning of the study—and
a DSM-IV diagnosis of PTSD. Participants viewed a fixed order presentation of
neutral words (fruits), general threat words (e.g., “coffin”), and trauma-related words
(e.g., “rape”) in addition to a control card of cluster of X’s. CSA-only women with
PTSD had longer response latencies in color-naming trauma-related threat words than
other words. Further, compared to the CSA-only PTSD group, revictimized PTSD
group showed longer color-naming latencies for trauma-related words. This greater
attentional bias in the revictimized PTSD group may have resulted from
revictimization functioning as a prime in activating preexisting trauma fear structures
formed from early sexual abuse experiences in women with PTSD (Foa et al., 1991).
Survivors with multiple sexual victimization experiences may also possess more
elaborate and tightly knit fear structures related to their victimization experiences than
do survivors with victimization experiences in either childhood or adulthood (Foa et
al.).
Although consistent with prior findings that individuals respond with greater
emotional distress to sexual victimization in adulthood if they also had an experience
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of CSA than when they do not (Follette, Polusny, Bechtle, & Naugle, 1996; Nishith,
Mechanic, & Resick, 2000), absence of CSA without PTSD group, ASA only group,
and nonabused group as comparisons limits the inferences drawn from this study.
Nevertheless, this study highlights the importance of examining the joint effects of
sexual victimization experiences in childhood and adulthood on subsequent attentional
bias to emotional information. This finding regarding cumulative impact of sexual
victimization on emotional attentional bias is important considering higher rates of
sexual revictimization among individuals with a history of sexual victimization
(Roodman & Clum, 2001). Furthermore, studies have found that multiple experiences
of sexual victimization are linked to increased risk for the development of PTSD
(Nishith et al.). Thus, it seems likely that revictimized survivors, who may also have
greater levels of PTSD symptoms, will display greater attentional biases as compared
to singly victimized survivors (i.e., either in childhood or adulthood). However, this
remains to be tested.
Gaps in the Current Literature
The above review provides initial evidence for associations between sexual
victimization, visual attentional bias, and PTSD; however, the findings are less
consistent and there are several gaps that require further inquiry.
First, few studies have focused exclusively on sexual victimization survivors.
Indeed, several of the above-mentioned studies included survivors with multiple forms
of victimization and did not distinguish between the different types or examine their
unique relations with attentional deployment. Given the probability that survivors
differ in the processing of emotional cues depending on their specific victimization
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experiences (Pollak et al., 2000), possibly due to differences in the activation of fear
structures or schemas from their trauma, it is essential that future work also assess
unique effects of sexual victimization on biased attentional processing of emotional
information.
Second, the differential contributions of single sexual victimization (in either
childhood/adolescence or adulthood) and revictimization to later attentional biases are
not clear. In particular, studies among adult survivors of CSA have often failed to
account for ASA experiences. Likewise, studies of ASA survivors have not
determined whether the observed attentional biases resulted only from ASA or were
perhaps also influenced by CSA that was not assessed, which would be an indication
of the cumulative impact of revictimization. Moreover, only one study (Field et al.,
2001) has examined the cumulative impact of sexual victimization on attentional bias.
Furthermore, given the important role attentional processes play in revictimization
such as greater deficits in recognition of danger cues observed in revictimized women
(Messman-Moore & Brown, 2006), it is important that future studies examine
differences between survivors with single victimization experiences and
revictimization.
Third, studies among survivors with childhood victimization experiences
including CSA provide support for facilitated attention to angry and happy stimuli,
delayed disengagement from angry stimuli, and attentional avoidance of angry and
happy stimuli, at different durations of stimulus presentation on different tasks. On the
other hand, one study (Pineles et al., 2009) of ASA survivors revealed delayed
disengagement from trauma-related stimuli but not facilitated attention to the same
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stimuli. More work using stronger methodology is needed to resolve discrepancies in
the existing literature regarding the nature of attentional biases and identify attentional
biases that pertain uniquely to sexual victimization survivors. Further, there is some
indication with anxious individuals that different aspects of attentional bias are
evidenced at different stages of processing emotional information, with heightened
vigilance observed immediately after stimulus presentation, delayed disengagement
thereafter, and avoidance of salient cues during longer durations (Cisler & Koster,
2010). Thus, examining whether attention varies as a function of time from the onset
of stimulus presentation is important and provides a complete view of different aspects
relevant to victimization survivors.
In addition to the lack of clarity regarding the nature of attentional bias in
sexual victimization survivors, existing data do not provide a consistent picture
regarding whether survivors exhibit attentional bias toward trauma-related stimuli in
particular or to emotional stimuli more generally. Although some findings indicate
that attentional bias pertains to trauma-related stimuli more than general negative
stimuli in trauma survivors with PTSD (McNally, 1998; Pineles et al., 2009), others
theorize that trauma survivors show biases in attention to a wide array of threatening
stimuli, including safer negative stimuli along with trauma-related stimuli that suggest
danger (Foa & Kozak, 1986). Moreover, some studies have noted that survivors show
biased attention to positive stimuli as well (Fani et al., 2010). Future investigation is
needed to understand the different components of attentional bias, biases to different
emotional stimuli, and whether attention varies over time during stimulus presentation.
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Next, previous analyses of the association between PTSD and attentional
biases in survivors have yielded mixed findings. While some studies conclude that a
PTSD diagnosis or high PTSD symptom level underlies exaggerated attentional biases
demonstrated by childhood and adulthood victimization survivors, others found that
greater victimization severity is sufficient to predict attentional biases. However, it is
possible that survivors with severe or multiple victimization experiences are more
likely to evidence greater PTSD symptomatology and attentional biases. Thus, it
remains to be fully understood whether the effect of sexual victimization on attention
to emotional visual stimuli is dependent on the levels of survivors’ current PTSD
symptomatology in order to understand if these attentional biases are unique to PTSD
or if these are simply a consequence of sexual victimization experience. Regardless, a
larger consensus in the empirical and theoretical literature is that attentional biases to
salient emotional stimuli are related to the severity of PTSD symptoms (Aupperle et
al., 2011; Bryant & Harvey, 1995). It is likely that deficits in attentional deployment
that emerge following exposure to severe victimization experiences such as facilitated
attention, delayed disengagement, and attentional avoidance may contribute to and
sustain symptoms of hypervigilance, re-experiencing, and avoidance coping, which
are considered hallmark of PTSD. Further research is needed to determine whether
maladaptive attentional deployment in sexual victimization survivors is dependent on
the levels of their current PTSD symptomatology.
Moreover, several of the existing studies have focused on a comparison of
survivors with and without a current PTSD diagnosis. In recent years, there has been
growing recognition that studies examining the effects of trauma only on survivors
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who meet the diagnostic criteria for a PTSD diagnosis may obscure meaningful
differences across the full range of PTSD symptom presentation. This perspective
emphasizes that PTSD is a dimensional entity with different stress-related symptom
patterns experienced on a continuum rather than a discrete clinical syndrome (Ruscio,
Ruscio, & Keane, 2002), which highlights a need to consider levels of PTSD symptom
severity and symptom cluster differences in survivors rather than presence or absence
of PTSD diagnosis. This is even more important considering some empirical evidence
that the different components of attentional bias may be implicated by different PTSD
symptoms. For example, hypervigilance and hyperarousal symptoms may be related to
faster initial orientation or facilitated attention to trauma-related stimuli whereas
intrusive symptoms or rumination may be related to delayed disengagement from
trauma-related stimuli (Pineles et al., 2009). Other researchers have found that
facilitated attention to trauma-related stimuli is also related to intrusive symptoms
(Cassiday et al., 1992), whereas facilitated attention to happy stimuli is related to
avoidance and numbing symptoms (Fani et al., 2010). Thus, future research needs to
examine associations between specific PTSD symptom clusters and attentional biases.
Finally, as noted, differences in methods used to assess attentional bias may
account for some of the discrepant results. Many commonly used paradigms, such as
the Stroop task, do not adequately distinguish the different patterns of attentional bias
such as facilitated attention to, delayed disengagement from, and avoidance of traumarelated stimuli. Furthermore, these paradigms provide only assessment at one time
point after stimulus presentation rather than assess the time course of attentional
process during the presentation of stimuli. Moreover, several of these paradigms draw
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indirect inferences about attentional bias based on another unrelated task performance
(e.g., color naming, identify location of cue, or find the odd stimulus out), which also
hinders natural viewing of the stimuli. Further, there is little comparison across stimuli
used to assess attentional processing in participants. The majority of the studies have
utilized lexically based methods (i.e., words) and emotional faces rather than more
ecologically relevant stimuli such as pictures of emotional scenes that may offer direct
insight into the processing of visual information. The present study examines
associations between sexual victimization, attentional bias, and PTSD using an
observational, eyetracking methodology that addresses some of the limitations of the
existing literature. In particular, eyetracking directly captures different aspects of
attentional bias to ecologically salient stimuli and allows for a time course evaluation
of eye movements over a period of time.
Purpose of the Present Study
Based on the overview of empirical literature relevant to attentional bias and
PTSD in sexual victimization survivors, the present study is intended to address some
of the major gaps and limitations in the literature. The study will utilize a natural
viewing paradigm, an eyetracker that offers a direct, non-invasive assessment of
hypervigilance and avoidance behavior without reliance on inferences from reaction
time tasks or performance on a secondary task regarding facilitation or interference.
By assessing overt gaze fixation patterns, fixation durations, and shifts in eye
movements, this method allows for a continuous index of overt attention allocation to
emotionally-salient or non-salient stimuli (Nummenmaa, Hyönä, & Calvo, 2006) that
reflects the variation in the nature of attentional bias at different stages of processing
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of emotional stimuli (Calvo & Avero, 2005). Although a few studies have employed
this technology among trauma survivors (e.g., motor vehicle accident survivors in
Bryant, Harvey, Gordon, & Barry, 1995; Iraqi war veterans in Kimble et al., 2010), it
appears that no studies have utilized this approach in studying attentional biases in
sexual victimization survivors. Specifically, the present study compares attentional
biases in women who are non-victimized, singly victimized or non-revictimized, and
revictimized when presented with pairs of trauma-related (i.e., rape), general negative
and positive pictures on the eyetracker. The study also explores whether the nature of
attentional bias varies as a function of time from the onset of stimulus presentation
that would provide a complete view of attentional patterns relevant to sexual
victimization survivors when confronted with emotional information. Finally, the
current study assesses the role of PTSD symptomatology (i.e., total PTSD symptoms
as well as three clusters of PTSD symptoms) in the relationship between sexual
victimization and greater attentional bias. The results of this study may improve
current understanding of emotional attentional bias in sexual victimization survivors,
while also advancing efforts aimed at prevention and intervention of PTSD.
Specific Aims and Corresponding Hypotheses
The specific aims and corresponding hypotheses of this study are to:
Aim 1. Examine the associations between sexual victimization and visual
attentional biases in the processing of trauma-related stimuli (i.e., rape pictures).
Hypothesis 1a. Women who have experienced sexual revictimization will
quickly fix their first gaze on rape pictures when paired with positive or negative
pictures than will women with single victimization experience or no victimization.
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Hypothesis 1b. Women who have experienced sexual revictimization will
dwell longer the first time they look at rape pictures when paired with positive or
negative pictures than will women with single victimization experience or no
victimization.
Hypothesis 1c. Women who have experienced sexual revictimization will
dwell longer on rape pictures when paired with positive or negative pictures than will
women with single victimization experience or no victimization.
Hypothesis 1d. Women who have experienced sexual revictimization will
make more revisits to rape pictures when paired with positive or negative pictures
than will women with single victimization experience or no victimization.
Aim 2. Examine whether PTSD symptomatology predicts attentional
processing of trauma-related stimuli (i.e., rape pictures) in sexually victimized women.
Hypothesis 2a. Sexually victimized women higher in PTSD symptoms will
quickly fix their first gaze on rape pictures when paired with positive or negative
pictures than will victimized women lower in PTSD symptoms.
Hypothesis 2b. Sexually victimized women higher in PTSD symptoms will
dwell longer the first time they look at rape pictures when paired with positive or
negative pictures than will victimized women lower in PTSD symptoms.
Hypothesis 2c. Sexually victimized women higher in PTSD symptoms will
dwell longer on rape pictures when paired with positive or negative pictures than will
victimized women lower in PTSD symptoms.
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Hypothesis 2d. Sexually victimized women higher in PTSD symptoms will
make more revisits to rape pictures when paired with positive or negative pictures
than will victimized women lower in PTSD symptoms.
Aim 3. Examine whether sexual victimization predict variations in fixation
patterns for the trauma stimulus (i.e., rape picture) of the pair of stimuli across trial
duration.
Hypothesis 3. All women, regardless of their victimization history, will
initially display similar likelihood to fixate on the rape picture. However, women who
have experienced sexual revictimization will display progressively less fixations on
the rape picture of the pair of stimuli across trial duration than will women with single
victimization experience or no victimization. On the other hand, women with single
victimization experience and no victimization will display faster decline in fixations
on the rape picture across trial duration than will women with revictimization
experience.
Finally, for the purposes of the larger study, participants were randomly
assigned to a negative or neutral mood induction prior to completing the eyetracking
task. Therefore, we explored the effects of negative mood on participants’ attentional
bias to different emotional stimuli. Exploratory analyses also assessed for the presence
of interactions between induced mood, sexual victimization history, and attentional
bias variables, which may confound the main effects that the study was designed to
assess. Ample evidence suggests the link between increased negative emotional state
and greater biased attentional processing of negative stimuli among anxious and
depressed people (e.g., Bar-Haim et al., 2007; Frewen, Dozois, Joanisse, & Neufeld,
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2008) as well as nonclinical samples (Becker & Leinenger, 2011). Mood-congruent
attentional bias for positive stimuli has also been noted among nonclinical samples,
with positive mood induction increasing their attention to positive information,
particularly highly-valenced positive stimuli (Tamir & Robinson, 2007; Wadlinger &
Isaacowitz, 2006). These findings suggest that one’s current emotional state can
actually alter aspects of one’s conscious experience such as attentional deployment.
Similar findings were observed in a study that investigated this proposition among
physically abused male and female children where participants who experienced
higher levels of maltreatment showed preferential attention to sad stimuli only after
they experienced a sad emotional state (Romens & Pollak, 2012). Indeed,
maltreatment experiences such as sexual victimization may influence physiological
reactivity to emotional states (Pine, 2003; Romens & Pollak), which in turn alters
attentional processing of emotional information (Roelofs, Bakvis, Hermans, van Pelt,
& van Honk, 2007). These findings could imply that women with sexual
revictimization experiences may display greater attentional biases to highly-negative
and salient trauma-related stimuli while in a negative emotional state, compared to
women with single victimization experience and no victimization. However,
hypotheses concerning the impact of mood condition on emotional attentional biases
are not specified in the current study and related analyses are exploratory in nature
given that there are no studies to date that have examined the influence of temporary
emotional state on attentional biases in sexually victimized individuals.
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Chapter 2: Method
Participants
The sample for the current study included 142 undergraduate women attending
the University of Nebraska—Lincoln who participated in a larger investigation
exploring emotions, cognitions, and early life experiences. Twelve participants from
the larger study were excluded from the analyses because of missing data for all
primary variables of the current study. Participants were predominantly EuropeanAmerican (n = 121; 85%); however, 6% (n = 8) were Asian/Asian American, 4% (n =
6) were Hispanic/Latino, 3.5% (n = 5) were African American, 1% (n = 1) was Middle
Eastern, and 1% (n = 1) was of unknown ethnicity. The average age for participants
was 20.9 years (SD = 3.34; range = 19-42), with an average socioeconomic
background within the middle- to upper-middle-class range. Although most
participants (88%, n = 125) had never been married, 4% (n = 6) were married, 7% (n =
10) were cohabitating with a partner, and 1% (n = 1) was divorced.
Measures
Four primary classes of variables were analyzed for the purposes of this study:
(1) victimization variables (childhood/adolescence sexual victimization and adult
sexual victimization), (2) in vivo attentional bias variables assessed using eyetracker,
(3) survivors’ current PTSD symptoms, and (4) mood manipulation.
Victimization Measures
Childhood sexual victimization. Two retrospective self-report questionnaires
were used to maximize detection of sexual abuse experiences prior to age 18.
Participants completed the sexual abuse subscale of the Childhood Trauma
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Questionnaire (CTQ; Bernstein et al., 2003), which is comprised of five items
specifically designed to assess the frequency of sexual abuse experiences while
growing up (e.g., “When I was growing up, someone tried to touch me in a sexual
way, or tried to make me touch them”). Each item on the CTQ is rated on a five-point
Likert scale, anchored from 1 (never true) to 5 (very often true), and asks about
experiences before the age of 18. A sum of all responses represents a severity score
ranging from 5 to 25, with higher scores representing more severe sexual abuse in
childhood. Participants were classified as victims and nonvictims based on a
recommended cutoff score derived from Receiver Operator Characteristic analyses
with those scoring six or greater considered as victims and those scoring five
considered nonvictims (Bernstein & Fink, 1998). Several studies have shown good
reliability and validity of scores on this measure in both clinical and community populations
(e.g., Bernstein et al., 1994; Bernstein et al., 2003) as well as within an undergraduate
population (Paivio & Cramer, 2004). Additionally, the CTQ indices significantly correlate
with other measures of child maltreatment (e.g., the Childhood Trauma Interview; Bernstein
et al., 1994). Alpha was .92 for the sexual abuse subscale in the present study.
Participants also completed the sexual abuse subscale of the Computer Assisted
Maltreatment Inventory (CAMI; DiLillo et al., 2010), a comprehensive self-report measure
that screens and assesses sexual abuse experiences occurring prior to age 18. This
instrument presents respondents with a list of sexual experiences varying in severity
(e.g., kissing, fondling or sexual touching, oral, anal, or vaginal intercourse) and
respondents are asked to indicate whether they experienced any of these either (a) with
a family member or an individual who was at least five years older before the age of
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14; or (b) against their will, involved force, or occurred with someone at least 10 years
older if the incident(s) occurred between ages 14 and 17. However, the CAMI
instructs the participants to exclude voluntary sexual play with a similar age peer,
voluntary sexual activities with a dating partner, and non-contact forms of sexual
abuse such as exhibitionism as sexually abusive behavior. In contrast to the Likert-type
items on the CTQ, the CAMI employs three behaviorally specific screener questions any of
which, if answered affirmatively, would be followed by more detailed questions about
various dimensions of each victimization experience (e.g., nature, frequency, duration and
severity of the abuse, age at the time of abuse, relationship to the perpetrator, use of force,
and number of perpetrators involved) as well as reactions related to specific victimization
experiences (e.g., emotions, disclosure, and social support; DiLillo et al., 2006). In the
current study, participants who responded positively to one or more of the screener
items were considered potential victims of CSA. The sexual abuse subscale has a testretest coefficient of .71 and has shown high rate of agreement in abuse status with
concurrent measures of child sexual maltreatment such as the sexual abuse subscale of
the CTQ (percentage agreement = 92.5%; DiLillo et al., 2006).
Research supports the utility of administering both these measures rather than
either one alone in identifying survivors of CSA. DiLillo and colleagues (2006) found
that the sexual abuse subscale of CTQ was more sensitive in detecting less severe
sexual abuse experiences than the CAMI sexual abuse subscale, whereas the
behaviorally specific CAMI captured all explicit instances of sexual abuse, some of
which were not captured by the CTQ. Therefore, the CTQ was used in conjunction
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with the CAMI to identify survivors of CSA. Participants in this study were classified as
victims of CSA if they endorsed victimization on either the CTQ or CAMI.
Adult sexual victimization. Adult sexual victimization (since age 18) was
assessed using the Modified Sexual Experiences Survey (MSES; Messman-Moore &
Brown, 2004), an expanded version of the Sexual Experiences Survey (SES; Koss &
Gidycz, 1985). The MSES consists of eighteen items assessing three types of
unwanted sexual acts, including sexual contact (e.g., kissing, fondling), oral-genital
contact, and vaginal or anal penetration. For each type of unwanted sexual contact,
participants were asked about different perpetrator tactics: methods of coercion
(continual arguments or pressure and misuse of authority) or force (physical force and
alcohol or drug intoxication). Participants who endorsed one or more of the sexual
victimization experiences occurring during or after the age of 18 were considered
survivors of adult sexual victimization. The original SES is a psychometrically valid
measure that has an internal consistency coefficient of .74 and a 1-week test-retest
coefficient of .93 (Koss & Gidycz). Alpha for the MSES in the current study was .82.
For the current study, participants’ sexual victimization status was comprised
of three groups: non-victimized, non-revictimized or singly victimized (i.e., sexual
victimization in childhood/adolescence or adulthood), and revictimized (i.e., sexual
victimization experiences in childhood/adolescence and adulthood).
Attentional Bias
Split-screen task. Participants were presented with 40 slides on a computer
screen, with each slide portraying two pictures: one on the right side of the slide and
one on the left slide (see Appendix C for sample stimuli). Each of the 40 trials
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comprised one of the following pairs: (a) one negative picture and one positive picture
(n = 18 pairs), (b) one positive picture and one sexual victimization picture (n = 4
pairs), (c) one negative picture and one sexual victimization (herein referred to as
“rape”) picture (n = 6 pairs), (d) two positive pictures (n = 6 pairs), or (e) two negative
pictures (n = 6 pairs). The analyses in the current study only included pairs of
affectively different pictures (i.e., rape-positive, rape-negative, and positive-negative
pictures). The positive (e.g., flower, newlyweds) and negative (e.g., tombstone, a man
holding a woman at gunpoint) pictures were drawn primarily from the International
Affective Pictures System (IAPS; Lang, Bradley, & Cuthbert, 1997). The IAPS
pictures have been normatively matched for emotional valence and arousal (Lang et
al.). Efforts were made to match all pictures on themes (e.g., both pictures may be
interpersonal or inanimate), number of people, overall complexity, and image quality.
The pictures types on each slide were counterbalanced by side. In addition, slides were
randomly presented to each participant. Each slide was presented for a total of 5000
ms with an inter-trial interval of 500 ms. At the beginning of each trial, a fixation
point appeared in the middle of the screen and participants were instructed to look
directly at it and to press the spacebar to initiate the trial. In each trial, slide
presentation was followed by a picture-rating task asking participants to rate “how
they felt about the just viewed picture” on a scale of 1 (very negative) to 9 (very
positive).
Eyetracker apparatus. An eyetracker apparatus was utilized to monitor
participants’ eye gaze fixations and movements during picture presentation.
Specifically, the study utilized the SR Research Ltd. EyeLink II system, a second
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generation, video-based eyetracking system that captures natural gaze shifts in both
eyes over a long period upon presentation of stimuli competing for attentional
resources. The apparatus includes three small cameras mounted on a headband that the
participant wears; one camera is directed at each eye and the third camera tracks
information about the environment. Seventeen-point validation and calibration
accuracy tests were initially performed to minimize error. Calibration was repeated if
any point was in error by more than 1° or if the average error for all points was greater
than 0.5°. On occasions when the eyetracker is unable to track both eyes, one eye was
chosen for tracking, such as is done in Kimble et al. (2010). For the purposes of the
present study, visual attention indices, including first fixation time, first run dwell
time, overall dwell time, and run count, were analyzed using the eyetracker method to
draw conclusions regarding visual attentional biases in sexually victimized women. A
description of these indices is provided in Table 1.
PTSD Symptoms
The PTSD Checklist-Civilian Version (PCL-C; Weathers et al., 1993) is a 17-item
self-report measure designed to assess presence and severity of PTSD symptomatology,
including re-experiencing, avoidance, and arousal symptoms, as described in the DSM-IVTR (e.g., “How much have you been bothered by repeated, disturbing memories,
thoughts, or images of a stressful experience from the past in the last month?”).
Participants were asked to rate the severity of their symptoms during the previous
month using a five-point Likert scale ranging from 1 (not at all) to 5 (extremely). The
summed score across all responses served as an indicator of total PTSD symptoms,
with higher scores indicating greater levels of symptomatology. Separate summed
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scores for three PTSD clusters were also created for the analyses. The PCL-C has
internal consistency ranging from .89 to .97 and test-retest reliability of .96 (Weathers et al.),
and correlates highly with interview-based measures of PTSD (r = .93; Blanchard, JonesAlexander, Buckley, & Forneris, 1996). Alpha for the PCL-C in the current study was
.95.
Mood Manipulation
Mood induction. Participants were randomly assigned to a negative or neutral
mood condition prior to the eyetracking task as part of the larger study, which
involved watching a 4.5-minute film clip to induce either a negative or mildly pleasant
emotional state. This is built on the empirical findings that people deliberately choose
to focus on positive stimuli to counteract negative moods and those who, alternatively,
selectively attend toward negative stimuli maintain or exacerbate their negative moods
(Wadlinger & Isaacowitz, 2008). The negative film clip depicted a scene from the
movie “The Deer Hunter” in which captured soldiers were forced to play Russian
roulette. This clip has been shown to elicit negative affect in participants in prior
studies (Campbell-Sills, Barlow, Brown, & Hofmann, 2006) as evidenced by
significant mean pre-to-post Positive and Negative Affective Schedule (PANAS)
negative affect change scores and participant reports of emotional experiences such as
feeling distressed, upset, anxious, and nervous. Participants in the neutral mood
condition watched a clip portraying scenery from the film “Denali.” Although this clip
has been found to induce a mildly pleasant emotional state in some studies
(Rottenberg, Ray, & Gross, 2007), researchers have suggested that this is a preferred
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alternative to abstract neutral visual displays that may elicit mild annoyance or
boredom (Gross & Levenson, 1995).
Demographic Questionnaire
Participants also completed a questionnaire assessing demographic variables,
including age, ethnicity, marital status, sexual orientation, education, employment,
religious affiliation, household income, life-threatening experiences before eighteen
years of age, and parental factors.
Procedure
In the larger study, participants were primarily recruited through
announcements posted on Experimetrix, an online service that posts and schedules
experiments conducted within psychology departments for course credit. Participants
were also recruited directly from undergraduate psychology courses. Students who
expressed interest in participating in the study, by providing their electronic mail (email) contact information on the sign-up sheet, received the e-mail contact information
and phone number for a study recruiter to sign up. To ensure a sufficient number of
participants with sexual abuse histories while maintaining participant privacy,
advertisements stated that, “although all [students] are welcome to participate, we are
most interested in those with sexual abuse histories.” Study procedures were approved
by the Institutional Review Board of University of Nebraska-Lincoln.
Trained undergraduate research assistants and three masters-level graduate
students administered the experiment. Participants were scheduled individually for
data collection sessions lasting approximately two and one half hours. After the
participants provided written informed consent to participate in the study, they were
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randomly assigned to either a neutral or negative mood condition. Participants were
then fitted with the eyetracker apparatus and validation and calibration procedures for
the eyetracker were completed on a computer. They then watched the mood induction
film clip on a second computer in the same room. After completing another calibration
procedure on the first computer, they were informed that they would see a series of
positive and negative pictures on the computer screen and they should view the
pictures “naturally as if at home while watching TV.” The split screen picture-rating
task was then administered. Next, participants completed other self-report
questionnaires through the Media Lab software installed on a computer in a different
room. Finally, participants were debriefed, thanked for their participation, and given
course credit in exchange for their participation.
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Chapter 3: Data Analyses
The present study utilized an eyetracking procedure to examine participants’
attentional biases by capturing their eye movement behavior to 40 trials. Each trial
lasted five seconds and depicted two of the three types of emotional (positive,
negative, and rape) pictures, which were presented adjacently with a small blank white
space in the center separating them. Screens with a picture-rating scale requiring
participants to rate how they felt about the just viewed picture were interspersed
between the trials and presented until the participants responded. Following the
eyetracking task, self-report data on sexual victimization history and current PTSD
symptomatology were gathered using questionnaires presented on a computer.
Crossed Random Effects Modeling
Data analyses for the current study were conducted in two parts. A crossed
random effects modeling was utilized in the first section to determine the proposed
relationships between sexual victimization, PTSD, and attentional biases (aims 1 and
2). For testing hypotheses 1a through 2d, analyses were conducted at the level of
individual eye movements, which were nested within 40 trials and within 142
participants, and in which participants and trials were crossed (i.e., every individual
received every trial). Additionally, because participants vary in the timing of eye
movements during the time course of gaze across trials, multilevel models with
participants and trials as crossed random effects were used to account for the resulting
unbalanced data. A crossed random effects modeling also permitted the most accurate
test of the effects of predictors while capturing all sources of variation simultaneously
(Hoffman & Rovine, 2007). Participants’ visual attentional patterns (see Table 1 for a
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description of visuo-motor behaviors of interest that were used to infer attentional
biases in the current study), including first fixation time, first run dwell time, overall
dwell time, and run count, served as the dependent variables in these analyses.
The present study investigated participants’ preference for a certain type of
emotional picture (e.g., rape) when paired with one of the two kinds of contrasting
pictures (e.g., positive and negative). Thus, the only predictor variable for the pictures
to explain item-level variance was slide type, which refers to the kind of contrasting
picture that a picture was paired with. The three slide types used in the current study
included rape slide type that includes trials where a rape picture is paired with either a
positive or negative picture; positive slide type that includes trials where a positive
picture is paired with either a rape or negative picture; and negative slide type that
includes trials where a negative picture is paired with either a positive or rape picture.
Each slide type included two picture comparisons. For example, rape slide type
includes a comparison between rape pictures paired with positive pictures and rape
pictures paired with negative pictures. Positive slide type includes a comparison
between positive pictures paired with negative pictures and positive pictures paired
with rape pictures, and negative slide type includes a comparison between negative
pictures paired with positive pictures and negative pictures paired with rape pictures.

Table 1
Description of Visual Attentional Patterns Used to Infer Attentional Biases in the Current Study

Type of Visual Attentional Pattern

Operationalization

First Fixation Time
(milliseconds)

Refers to the amount of time that elapses following the start of each trial until the first fixation on each picture.
First fixation time is measured for all three types of slide type comparisons: rape, positive, and negative. In a slide
type comparison (e.g., rape-positive slide type where a rape picture is paired with a positive picture), higher first
fixation time for one picture (e.g., rape) indicates a bias towards slowly fixating first gaze on that picture (rape) at
the start of the trial when compared to the other picture that it was paired with (positive).

First Run Dwell Time (milliseconds)

Refers to the amount of time participants spend on each picture the first time they look at it during each trial. First
run dwell time is measured for all three types of slide type comparisons: rape, positive, and negative. In a slide
type comparison (e.g., rape-positive slide type where a rape picture is paired with a positive picture), higher first
run dwell time for one picture (e.g., rape) indicates a bias towards dwelling longer the first time they looked at that
picture (rape) at the start of the trial as opposed to the other picture that it was paired with (positive).

Dwell Time
(milliseconds)

Refers to the amount of time participants spend looking at each type of picture during each trial. Dwell time is
measured for all three types of slide type comparisons: rape, positive, and negative. In a slide type comparison
(e.g., rape-positive slide type where a rape picture is paired with a positive picture), higher dwell time for one
picture (e.g., rape) indicates a bias towards dwelling longer on that picture (rape) as opposed to the other picture
that it was paired with (positive).

Run Count

Refers to the number of times participants revisit each type of picture during each trial (i.e., number of gaze
aversions and returns). Run count is measured for all three types of slide type comparisons: rape, positive, and
negative. In a slide type comparison (e.g., rape-positive slide type where a rape picture is paired with a positive
picture), higher run count for one picture (e.g., rape) indicates a bias towards greater revisits to that picture (rape)
when compared to the other picture it was paired with (positive).
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Although the primary hypotheses pertained to rape picture comparisons (i.e., rapepositive versus rape-negative trials), we conducted exploratory analyses on how the
proposed patterns present for positive and negative picture comparisons as well.
There were three predictor variables for participants. The first one was
victimization history, which was classified into three groups: revictimized (i.e., sexual
victimization in childhood/adolescence and adulthood), singly victimized (i.e., sexual
victimization in childhood/adolescence or adulthood), and nonvictims (i.e., no sexual
victimization history). Total PTSD symptom score as well as the PTSD symptom
cluster scores (i.e., ‘B’ indicating intrusive recollection or re-experiencing symptoms,
‘C’ indicating avoidant/numbing symptoms, and ‘D’ indicating hyperarousal) on the
PCL-C questionnaire served as another set of predictors of participant variation. Each
PTSD variable (total and three cluster scores) was specified as a nested fixed effect
pertaining only to victims. Participants’ mood condition (i.e., whether they were
shown negative or neutral mood induction film clips prior to the eyetracking task) was
another subject predictor that was included in the model analyses to assess and control
for its effect on attentional outcome variables.
The first step in crossed random effects modeling involved determining
whether participants and pictures should be considered as random factors to account
for variation among participants (e.g., some participants may have looked at a picture
in the pair of stimuli longer than other participants did) and variation among pictures
(e.g., some pictures were looked at longer than other pictures each time participants
looked) for attentional outcome variables. In other words, we first examined the extent
of systematic mean differences in the four attentional outcome variables across

49
participants and across pictures by estimating three empty crossed random effects
models without predictors for each attentional outcome variable. We began by
estimating a baseline empty means model with no predictors but only residual
variance for each picture comparisons that assumed no random effects or systematic
mean differences between participants or between pictures for each attentional
outcome variable. Thereafter, we estimated a model that included random intercept for
subjects (i.e., mean differences across participants) followed by another model that
included random intercept for items (i.e., mean differences across pictures) for each
attentional outcome variable.
Restricted maximum likelihood (REML) was used to report model parameters
and the Satterthwaite method was used to estimate denominator degrees of freedom.
The significance of random effects, meaning the improvement in fit from adding
subject and item random intercepts, was evaluated by comparing the deviance values
of the models using −2 log-likelihood (−2ΔLL) tests and information criteria (AIC and
BIC) between models with the same fixed effects. The −2ΔLL or deviance difference
test is typically distributed as a chi-square with degrees of freedom equal to the
difference in the number of estimated model parameters. However, when the added
variance parameters have possible values that are bounded at zero, the −2ΔLL is
actually distributed as a combination of chi-square distributions with degrees of
freedom and degrees of freedom minus one. To acknowledge that −2ΔLL is only
approximately distributed for parameters with possible values with a boundary, we
used a more conservative significance test for the difference in model fit by using the
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original degrees of freedom (this will be indicated by adding ‘~’ in front of the test
degrees of freedom; Hoffman, n.d.).
In the next step, sequential conditional models were tested to examine the
effects of predictors, including victimization history, PTSD symptoms, slide type, and
mood condition, on each attentional outcome variable for each type of picture
comparison. We began with rape picture comparisons assessing the effect of
predictors on first fixation time. This allowed for a test of hypotheses that participants’
sexual victimization history (hypothesis 1a) as well as PTSD symptoms in survivors
(hypothesis 2a) would predict how quickly they looked at rape pictures when paired
with positive or negative pictures. We then examined the effect of slide type, which
refers to the kind of contrasting image that is paired with rape pictures to determine
whether participants’ first fixation time for rape pictures differs based on the type of
picture it was paired with (i.e., positive or negative). We also analyzed the effect of
mood condition to determine whether participants’ first fixation time for rape pictures
differs based on the type of mood induction film clip (i.e., negative or neutral) they
saw prior to the eyetracking task. Similarly, we examined the effect of predictors on
the remaining attentional outcome variables (first run dwell time, overall dwell time,
and run count) for rape picture comparisons. A series of conditional models was
estimated by removing nonsignificant interactions each time until the final fitted
crossed random effects model with interpretable parameters was obtained. Subsequent
to these primary analyses for rape picture comparisons, we also conducted crossed
random effects models for positive and negative picture comparisons.
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Table 2 to Table 5 present results from the final empty means crossed random
effects models with random intercepts for both participants and pictures for each
attentional outcome variable within each picture comparison. These tables also
provide the fixed and random effect estimates obtained from the final fitted
conditional crossed random effects models for each attentional outcome variable
within each picture comparison.
Generalized Linear Mixed Modeling
The second section of data analyses examined changes in the probability of
participants’ fixations on a rape picture as compared to the contrasting picture that it
was paired with (i.e., positive or negative). This provided a test of hypothesis 3 that
proposed that participants’ fixations on rape picture (as opposed to the contrasting
picture) may vary across the five-second trial duration. The dependent variable was a
dichotomous or binary variable that records whether participants looked at rape picture
versus the other picture (i.e., positive or negative) across the trial duration. A
generalized linear mixed model was conducted to account for the binary outcome
variable where the assumption of continuous scores and the residual normality
assumption are violated (Hox, 2010). In utilizing this growth modeling, the nonnormal outcome variable was transformed into a continuous variable using a logit link
function that represents the natural logarithm of odds ratio (i.e., log of the odds of the
probability of one) where predictors are combined in a linear combination to predict
the link-transformed outcome.
The first step in the analyses was to determine whether there was significant
within-cluster interdependence to warrant the use of a multilevel approach. Then,
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models were estimated for rape picture slides using PROC GLIMMIX procedure and
Laplace estimation method in SAS. First, an unconditional model with random
intercepts for persons and slides model that predicts no change in the dependent
variable on average was assessed as a baseline model for comparison of fit of
subsequent models. Thereafter, fixed effects of predictors (victimization history and
slide type) as well as fixed and random effects of time were added sequentially and
analyzed. In this study, fixations were nested within slides, which were nested within
persons, and time was centered such that 0 indicated the start of a trial. The random
effects associated with level-1 fixation time were examined at level 2 (i.e., slide within
person) and at level 3 (i.e., person) to assess whether the effect of predictors varied
over slides and persons. For each model that included random slopes for time, random
slopes were added in level 2 RANDOM statement first, which if significant, was
subsequently added in level 3. The significance of random effects was evaluated using
−2ΔLL tests and information criteria between models with the same fixed effects. The
significance of fixed effects was evaluated using Wald test (p < .05).
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Chapter 4: Results
Preliminary Analyses
Based on the responses from the CTQ, CAMI, and MSES, 48.1% (n = 74) of
participants reported a history of sexual victimization in childhood/adolescence or
adulthood, 18.2% (n = 28) in both childhood/adolescence and adulthood, and 33.8% (n
= 52) with no sexual victimization history.
Primary Analyses
Results from the crossed random effects modeling are presented first to
elucidate the effects of predictors (victimization, PTSD, slide type, and mood
condition) on four attentional outcome variables within each of the three types of
emotional picture comparisons. Specifically, findings regarding the extent of
systematic mean differences in each attentional outcome variable across participants
and pictures, and the need for subjects and items to be modeled as random effects are
presented. Thereafter, results from the hypothesized conditional models that depict the
extent to which these systematic mean differences are explained by predictors are
presented. Following this, findings from the generalized linear mixed modeling
regarding changes in the probability of participants’ fixations for rape pictures across
trial duration are presented.
Crossed Random Effects Models for Rape Picture Comparisons
First fixation time. First fixation time for rape pictures refers to the relative
length of time that elapsed from the onset of the trial until the rape picture of the pair
of stimuli received the first fixation. A series of empty crossed random effects models
indicated that, in rape picture comparisons, there were relatively greater systematic
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mean differences in first fixation time across pictures than across participants. The
empty means model that included both variances across pictures and participants
(random items and subjects model with random intercepts for items and subjects)
showed better model fit than the empty means model with only variation across
participants (random subjects model with only random subject intercept) as indicated
by significant deviance difference and relatively smaller AIC and BIC values. Indeed,
compared to the random subjects model, the random items and subjects model
indicated that there was significant variability in first fixation time for rape pictures
across participants, −2ΔLL(~1) = 6.2, p < .02, and across pictures, −2ΔLL(~1) = 445,
p < .001, such that 6% of the total variation in first fixation time was due to systematic
mean differences across participants, 29.49% was due to mean differences across
pictures, and the remaining 64.26% was due to participant by picture interaction.
Random intercepts for both participants and pictures along with residual variance were
retained for subsequent predictor analyses. A 95% random effects confidence intervals
was then computed to describe the size of random variation across participants and
across pictures using the formula: fixed intercept ± 1.96*SQRT (random intercept
variance), results of which are included in Table 2.

Table 2
Results for Empty Means and Conditional Crossed Random Effects Models for First Fixation Time within Each Picture Comparisons
Rape Picture Comparisons (Rape-Negative vs. Rape-Positive)
Empty Means, Random
Crossed Subjects and Items Conditional Model
Intercept Model
with Random Intercepts
Estimate SE
p
Estimate SE
p

Model Effects
Model for the Means
Intercept
Slide Type (rape-neg)
Victimization Group (singly victimized)
Victimization Group (revictimized)
Mood Condition (negative)
PTSD Total
Model for the Variance
Subject Random Intercept Variance
13884
3400.3 <.0001
Item Random Intercept Variance
65473 31338 0.02
Residual Variance
142674 5664.08 <.0001
Model Fit
Number of Parameters
3
REML –2LL
21008.9
REML AIC
21014.9
REML BIC
21009.9
95% Random Effects Confidence Intervals from Empty Means Random Intercept Model
Individual Subject First Fixation Time Means
446.48 – 908.38
Individual Item First Fixation Time Means
175.91 – 1178.95

673.90
55.92
-4.97
-13.65
-38.77
-0.21

124.66 <.0001
171.83 0.75
32.65
0.88
41.48
0.74
28.63 0.18
1.25
0.87

14285
72806
142674

3496.05 <.0001
36905
0.02
5664.08 <.0001
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Positive Picture Comparisons (Positive-Negative vs. Positive-Rape)
Empty Means, Random
Crossed Subjects and Items Conditional Model
Intercept Model
with Random Intercepts
Estimate SE
p
Estimate SE
p

Model Effects
Model for the Means
Intercept
Slide Type (pos-neg)
Victimization Group (singly victimized)
Victimization Group (revictimized)
Mood Condition (negative)
PTSD Total
Model for the Variance
Subject Random Intercept Variance
19026
4049.65 <.0001
Item Random Intercept Variance
156430 47890 <.001
Residual Variance
341085 8660.76 <.0001
Model Fit
Number of Parameters
3
REML –2LL
51078.1
REML AIC
51084.1
REML BIC
51078.1
95% Random Effects Confidence Intervals from Empty Means Random Intercept Model
Individual Subject First Fixation Time Means
458.10 – 998.80
Individual Item First Fixation Time Means
-46.75 – 1503.65

687.51
116.94
-56.29
-93.28
-9.21
0.68

183.58
204.63
35.45
45.03
31.09
1.36

0.001
0.57
0.11
0.05
0.77
0.62

18830 4084.31 <.0001
161445 50564 0.001
341085 8660.76 <.0001
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Negative Picture Comparisons (Negative-Rape vs. Negative-Positive)
Empty Means, Random
Crossed Subjects and Items Conditional Model
Intercept Model
with Random Intercepts
Estimate SE
p
Estimate SE
p

Model Effects
Model for the Means
Intercept
Slide Type (neg-rape)
Victimization Group (singly victimized)
Victimization Group (revictimized)
Mood Condition (negative)
PTSD Total
Model for the Variance
Subject Random Intercept Variance
16779 2724.09 <.0001
Item Random Intercept Variance
56387 17297 <.001
Residual Variance
139308 3537.27 <.0001
Model Fit
Number of Parameters
3
REML –2LL
48222.5
REML AIC
48228.5
REML BIC
48222.5
95% Random Effects Confidence Intervals from Empty Means Random Intercept Model
Individual Subject First Fixation Time Means
308.55 – 816.33
Individual Item First Fixation Time Means
97.02 – 1027.86

564.9
56.9
-27.19
-17.97
5.51
-0.57

63.09
123.31
29.5
37.48
25.87
1.13

17253
2820.61
58515 18361
139308 3537.27

<.0001
0.65
0.36
0.63
0.83
0.62
<.0001
<.001
<.0001

Note. Bold values are p < .05.
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Sequential crossed random effects conditional models examined the effects of
victimization and PTSD symptoms on first fixation time for rape pictures.
Specifically, we tested hypothesis 1a that sexually victimized women, particularly
those with revictimization experiences, would quickly fix their first gaze on rape
pictures than the contrasting picture in the pair, when compared to women with
victimization in either childhood or adulthood (singly victimized), or no victimization.
We also examined hypothesis 2a that survivors higher in PTSD symptoms would
quickly fix their first gaze on rape pictures when compared to survivors lower in
PTSD symptoms. Although victimization and PTSD were the primary variables of
interest, we also explored the effects of slide type, which refers to the kind of
contrasting picture (e.g., positive or negative) that is paired with rape pictures, to
determine whether participants’ first fixation time for rape pictures differs based on
the contrasting picture. We also tested the effect of mood condition to determine
whether participants’ first fixation time for rape pictures differs based on whether they
saw negative or neutral mood induction film clip prior to the eyetracking procedure. A
series of models was estimated by removing nonsignificant interactions each time until
the final crossed random effects model with meaningful (i.e., contributing) parameters
was obtained (see Table 2 for final model).
Analyses yielded no significant main effects for item or subject predictors on
first fixation time for rape pictures when paired with positive or negative pictures.
Survivors, irrespective of their revictimization status and PTSD symptom levels, did
not engage in faster first fixation for rape pictures than nonvictims did. Thus, there
was zero reduction in the item variation and the subject variation in first fixation time,
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indicating that the variability in preferential first fixation time for rape pictures across
participants and pictures was unaccounted for by the predictors in the current study.
Summary. The findings from conditional models revealed that participants did
not differ in how rapidly they fix their first gaze on rape pictures, suggesting that
sexually victimized women did not show shorter first fixation time for visual traumarelated stimuli than nonvictims as predicted. Moreover, survivors’ revictimization
status and PTSD symptoms, their mood condition, and the contrasting picture that was
paired with rape pictures did not predict faster first fixation time for trauma-related
stimuli.
First run dwell time. First run dwell time for rape pictures refers to the
relative length of time participants spent looking at the rape picture the first time they
visited it. Compared to the empty means, random subjects model, the better fitting
random items and subjects model indicated that there was significant variability in
first run dwell time for rape pictures, −2ΔLL(~1) = 367.1, p < .001, such that 10.6% of
the total variation in first run dwell time was due to systematic mean differences
across participants, 24.18% was due to mean differences across pictures, and the
remaining 65.21% was due to participant by picture interaction. Random intercepts for
both participants and pictures along with residual variance were retained for
subsequent predictor analyses.
Sequential crossed random effects conditional models examined the effects of
victimization and PTSD symptoms on first run dwell time for rape pictures, allowing a
test of hypotheses that participants’ sexual revictimization history (hypothesis 1b) as
well as PTSD symptoms in survivors (hypothesis 2b) would predict how long they
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dwell the first time they looked at the rape picture of the pair of stimuli. Additionally,
the effects of slide type as well as mood condition were examined. The results from
the final crossed random effects conditional model are included in Table 3.

Table 3
Results for Empty Means and Conditional Crossed Random Effects Models for First Run Dwell Time within Each Picture
Comparisons
Rape Picture Comparisons (Rape-Negative vs. Rape-Positive)
Empty Means, Random
Crossed Subjects and Items Conditional Model
Intercept Model
with Random Intercepts
Estimate SE
p
Estimate SE
p

Model Effects
Model for the Means
Intercept
Slide Type (rape-neg)
Victimization Group (singly victimized)
Victimization Group (revictimized)
Mood Condition (negative)
PTSD Total
Model for the Variance
Subject Random Intercept Variance
78152
15149 <.0001
Item Random Intercept Variance
178057 85532 0.02
Residual Variance
480319 19068 <.0001
Model Fit
Number of Parameters
3
REML –2LL
22769.9
REML AIC
22775.9
REML BIC
22769.9
95% Random Effects Confidence Intervals from Empty Means Random Intercept Model
Individual Subject First Run Dwell Time Means
677.35 – 1773.21
Individual Item First Run Dwell Time Means
398.22 – 2052.34

1540.38
-527.55
-38.72
-38.95
-52.47
2.17

164.44
216.47
69.24
87.95
60.72
2.66

<.0001
0.04
0.58
0.66
0.39
0.42

80357
113764
480319

15629
58574
19068

0.03
<.0001
<.0001
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Positive Picture Comparisons (Positive-Negative vs. Positive-Rape)
Empty Means, Random
Crossed Subjects and Items Conditional Model
Intercept Model
with Random Intercepts
Estimate SE
p
Estimate SE
p

Model Effects
Model for the Means
Intercept
Slide Type (pos-neg)
Victimization Group (singly victimized)
Victimization Group (revictimized)
Mood Condition (negative)
PTSD Total
Model for the Variance
Subject Random Intercept Variance
41481
6168 <.0001
Item Random Intercept Variance
57923
17966 <..001
Residual Variance
236014 5992.83 <.0001
Model Fit
Number of Parameters
3
REML –2LL
49974.1
REML AIC
49980.1
REML BIC
49974.1
95% Random Effects Confidence Intervals from Empty Means Random Intercept Model
Individual Subject First Run Dwell Time Means
242.38 – 1040.76
Individual Item First Run Dwell Time Means
169.85 – 1113.29

603.26
97.76
-56.88
-66.88
10.81
-2.62

116.78
124.49
43.81
55.66
38.42
1.68

<.0001
0.44
0.20
0.23
0.78
0.12

41147 6216.84 <.0001
58979 18714 <.001
236014 5992.83<.0001
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Negative Picture Comparisons (Negative-Rape vs. Negative-Positive)
Empty Means, Random
Crossed Subjects and Items Conditional Model
Intercept Model
with Random Intercepts
Estimate SE
p
Estimate SE
p

Model Effects
Model for the Means
Intercept
Slide Type (neg-rape)
Victimization Group (singly victimized)
Victimization Group (revictimized)
Mood Condition (negative)
PTSD Total
Model for the Variance
Subject Random Intercept Variance
97002 13947 <.0001
Item Random Intercept Variance
141602 43673 <.001
Residual Variance
460656 11697 <.0001
Model Fit
Number of Parameters
3
REML –2LL
52183.2
REML AIC
52189.2
REML BIC
52183.2
95% Random Effects Confidence Intervals from Empty Means Random Intercept Model
Individual Subject First Fixation Time Means
466.99 – 1687.87
Individual Item First Fixation Time Means
339.88 – 1814.98

1214.18
-255.10
-46.73
-129.34
-68.11
1.59

105.96 <.0001
188.89 0.19
66.2 0.48
84.1 0.13
58.05 0.24
2.54
0.53

97342 14190
136374 43087
460656 11697

<.0001
<.001
<.0001

Note. Bold values are p < .05.
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In the final model, the fixed intercept of 1540.38 indicates that, for nonvictims
in the neutral mood condition, the expected first run dwell time for rape pictures when
paired with positive pictures was 1540.38 ms.
Contrary to hypothesis 1b, the main effect of victimization on first run dwell
time for rape pictures was nonsignificant, F(2, 137) = 0.18, p = .84, indicating that
there were no overall differences among women with experiences of revictimization,
single victimization, and no victimization in how long they dwelled the first time they
looked at rape pictures when their PTSD total symptom score was at the average score
of 31. This suggests that all participants, regardless of their victimization history,
dwelled on rape pictures to the same extent the first time they looked at them when
they had average PTSD total symptom score. Contrary to hypothesis 2b, the main
effect of PTSD total symptom score on survivors’ first run dwell time for rape pictures
was nonsignificant, F(1, 137) = 0.67, p = .42, indicating that survivors did not differ in
how long they dwelled the first time they looked at rape pictures depending on
variations in their PTSD total symptom score. Similarly, the three PTSD symptom
clusters did not have an effect on survivors’ first run dwell time in the current sample
as indicated by respective nonsignificant main effects. The results of PTSD symptom
clusters are not included in Table 3 given that the parameter values for other predictors
have also changed (although the significance of these predictor values did not change
from the model including PTSD total score).
Exploratory analyses revealed that there was a significant main effect of slide
type on participants’ first run dwell time for rape pictures, indicating that participants
showed overall differences in how long they dwelled the first time they looked at rape
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pictures depending on whether rape pictures were paired with positive pictures versus
negative pictures, F(1, 8) = 5.94, p = .04. Specifically, participants dwelled 527.55 ms
less the first time they looked at rape pictures when paired with negative pictures as
opposed to positive pictures. However, slide type did not interact with victimization or
mood condition. Finally, the main effect of participants’ mood condition on first run
dwell time for rape pictures was nonsignificant, F(1, 137) = 0.75, p = .39, such that
participants showed no overall differences in first run dwell time for rape pictures
when they were shown negative versus neutral mood induction film clip. Furthermore,
mood condition did not interact with victimization.
Regarding the extent that the final model explained variability in first run
dwell time, the item predictor, slide type accounted for 36.11% of the item variation in
first run dwell time for rape pictures. The subject predictors however did not account
for any subject variation in first run dwell time for rape pictures. Therefore, a
significant proportion of variability in preferential first run dwell time for rape pictures
across participants and pictures remains unaccounted for by the predictors used in this
study.
Summary. The results from conditional models revealed that sexually
victimized women did not differ from nonvictims in their attentional engagement
during their first fixation on visual trauma-related stimuli. However, participants were
more likely to dwell longer the first time they looked at rape pictures when these were
paired with positive pictures as opposed to negative pictures. No other factors
predicted longer first run dwell time for trauma-related stimuli in survivors.
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Dwell time. Dwell time in rape picture comparisons refers to the relative
length of time participants spent looking at rape pictures on average. The empty
means, random items and subjects model showed better model fit than the random
subjects model as indicated by significant deviance difference and relatively smaller
AIC and BIC values. Indeed, compared to the random subjects model, the random
items and subjects model indicated that there was significant variability in dwell time
for rape pictures across participants, −2ΔLL(~1) = 12, p < .001, and across pictures,
−2ΔLL(~1) = 369, p < .0001, such that 7.2% of the total variation was due to
systematic mean differences across participants, 25.19% was due to mean differences
across pictures, and the remaining 67.57% was due to participant by picture
interaction. Random intercepts for both participants and pictures along with residual
variance were retained for subsequent predictor analyses.
Sequential crossed random effects conditional models were tested to examine
the effects of victimization and PTSD symptoms on dwell time for rape pictures.
Specifically, we tested hypothesis 1c that revictimized women would dwell longer on
rape pictures on average when compared with women with single victimization
experience or no victimization. We also examined hypothesis 2c that survivors higher
in PTSD symptoms would dwell longer on rape pictures on average when compared
with survivors lower in PTSD symptoms. Additionally, we explored the effect of slide
type as well as mood condition. The results from the final crossed random effects
conditional model are reported in Table 4.

Table 4
Results for Empty Means and Conditional Crossed Random Effects Models for Dwell Time within Each Picture Comparisons
Rape Picture Comparisons (Rape-Negative vs. Rape-Positive)
Empty Means, Random
Crossed Subjects and Items Conditional Model
Intercept Model
with Random Intercepts
Estimate SE
p
Estimate SE
p

Model Effects
Model for the Means
Intercept
Slide Type (rape-neg)
Victimization Group (singly victimized)
Victimization Group (revictimized)
Mood Condition (negative)
PTSD Total
Model for the Variance
Subject Random Intercept Variance
49048
11437 <.0001
Item Random Intercept Variance
170589
81936 0.02
Residual Variance
457646
18168 <.0001
Model Fit
Number of Parameters
3
REML –2LL
22667.8
REML AIC
22673.8
REML BIC
22667.8
95% Random Effects Confidence Intervals from Empty Means Random Intercept Model
Individual Subject Dwell Time Means
1698.95 – 2567.11
Individual Item Dwell Time Means
1323.5 – 2942.56

2486.82
-590.77
-55.44
-62.31
-40.56
2.20

141.16
185.98
59.87
76.05
52.50
2.30

<.0001
0.01
0.36
0.41
0.44
0.34

50223
83251
457646

11739
43237
18168

<.0001
0.03
<.0001
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Positive Picture Comparisons (Positive-Negative vs. Positive-Rape)
Empty Means, Random
Crossed Subjects and Items Conditional Model
Intercept Model
with Random Intercepts
Estimate SE
p
Estimate SE
p

Model Effects
Model for the Means
Intercept
Slide Type (pos-neg)
Victimization Group (singly victimized)
Victimization Group (revictimized)
Mood Condition (negative)
PTSD Total

Model for the Variance
Subject Random Intercept Variance
41890
6886.86 <.0001
Item Random Intercept Variance
69248
21652 <.001
Residual Variance
364245 9248.86 <.0001
Model Fit
Number of Parameters
3
REML –2LL
51339.7
REML AIC
51345.7
REML BIC
51339.7
95% Random Effects Confidence Intervals from Empty Means Random Intercept Model
Individual Subject Dwell Time Means
1091.26 – 1893.56
Individual Item Dwell Time Means
976.64 – 2008.18

1520.8 129.01 <.0001
-10.38 138.64 0.94
-54.29 45.59 0.24
-56.97 57.91 0.33
43.26 39.98 0.28
-4.43
1.75 0.01

39827 6737.5 <.0001
72647 23211 <.001
364245 9248.86 <.0001
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Negative Picture Comparisons (Negative-Rape vs. Negative-Positive)
Empty Means, Random
Crossed Subjects and Items Conditional Model
Intercept Model
with Random Intercepts
Estimate SE p
Estimate SE
p

Model Effects
Model for the Means
Intercept
Slide Type (neg-rape)
Victimization Group (singly victimized)
Victimization Group (revictimized)
Mood Condition (negative)
PTSD Total
Model for the Variance
Subject Random Intercept Variance
45742
7850.41<.0001
Item Random Intercept Variance
106350 33044 <.001
Residual Variance
460804 11701 <.0001
Model Fit
Number of Parameters
3
REML –2LL
52096.8
REML AIC
52102.8
REML BIC
52096.8
95% Random Effects Confidence Intervals from Empty Means Random Intercept Model
Individual Subject Dwell Time Means
1885.66 – 2724.04
Individual Item Dwell Time Means
1665.67 – 2944.03

2417.1 79.39
-436.74 142.33
33.11
49.75
-13.63 63.2
-64.46 43.63
0.84
1.91

<.0001
0.01
0.51
0.83
0.14
0.66

46251 8025.05 <.0001
76027 24464 0.001
460804 11701 <.0001

Note. Bold values are p < .05.
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In the final model, the fixed intercept of 2486.82 indicates that, for nonvictims
in the neutral mood condition, the expected dwell time for rape pictures when paired
with positive pictures was 2486.82 ms.
Contrary to hypothesis 1c, the conditional main effect of victimization on
dwell time for rape pictures was nonsignificant, F(2, 137) = 0.52, p = .60, indicating
that there were no overall differences among women with experiences of
revictimization, single victimization, and no victimization in how long they spent
looking at rape pictures when their PTSD total symptom score was at the average (i.e.,
a score of 31 on the PCL-C). This suggests that all participants dwelled on rape
pictures to the same extent regardless of their victimization history when they had
average PTSD total symptom score.
Contrary to hypothesis 2c, the main effect of PTSD total symptom score on
survivors’ dwell time for rape pictures was nonsignificant, F(1, 137) = 0.92, p = .34,
indicating that survivors did not differ in how long they dwelled on rape pictures
depending on variations in their PTSD total symptom score. Similarly, the three PTSD
symptom clusters did not have an effect on survivors’ dwell time in the current sample
as indicated by respective nonsignificant main effects. The results of PTSD symptom
clusters are not included in Table 4. The other predictors, slide type and mood
condition, did not moderate the effect of PTSD symptoms on survivors’ dwell time for
rape pictures.
Exploratory analyses revealed that there was also a significant main effect of
slide type on participants’ dwell time for rape pictures, indicating that participants
showed overall differences in how long they spent looking at rape pictures depending
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on whether rape pictures were paired with positive pictures versus negative pictures,
F(1, 8) = 10.09, p = .01. Specifically, participants looked 590.77 ms less at rape
pictures when paired with negative pictures as opposed to positive pictures. However,
slide type did not interact with victimization or mood condition. Finally, the main
effect of participants’ mood condition on dwell time for rape pictures was
nonsignificant, F(1, 137) = 0.60, p = .44, such that participants showed no overall
differences in dwell time for rape pictures when they were shown negative versus
neutral mood induction film clip. Furthermore, mood condition did not interact with
victimization.
Regarding the extent that the final model explained variability in dwell time,
the item predictor, slide type accounted for 51.2% of the item variation in dwell time
for rape pictures. The subject predictors, including victimization, PTSD, and mood
condition, however, accounted for 0% of the subject variation in dwell time for rape
pictures. Therefore, a significant proportion of variability in preferential dwell time for
rape pictures across participants and pictures remains unaccounted for by the
predictors used in this study.
Summary. The results from conditional models revealed that higher levels of
PTSD symptomatology, particularly avoidance and numbing symptoms, predicted
longer dwell time for rape pictures among sexually victimized women. Thus, survivors
with high PTSD exhibited greater problems disengaging attention from visual traumarelated stimuli. All women in the sample were more likely to dwell longer on rape
pictures when these were paired with positive pictures rather than negative pictures.
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Run count. Run count in rape picture comparisons refers to the number of
times participants return to the rape picture after looking away from it. Compared to
the empty means, random subjects model, the better fitting random items and subjects
model indicated that there was significant variability in run count for rape pictures
across participants, −2ΔLL(~1) = 32, p < .0001, and across pictures, −2ΔLL(~1) =
94.6, p < .0001, such that 9.1% of the total variation in run count was due to
systematic mean differences across participants, 8.1% was due to mean differences
across pictures, and the remaining 82.79% was due to participant by picture
interaction. Random intercepts for both participants and pictures along with residual
variance were retained for subsequent predictor analyses.
Sequential crossed random effects conditional models examined the effects of
victimization and PTSD symptoms on run count for rape pictures, allowing a test of
hypotheses that participants’ sexual revictimization history (hypothesis 1d) as well as
PTSD symptoms in survivors (hypothesis 2d) would predict how often they revisit
rape pictures when paired with positive or negative pictures. We also examined the
effects of slide type as well as mood condition. The results from the final crossed
random effects conditional model are reported in Table 5.

Table 5
Results for Empty Means and Conditional Crossed Random Effects Models for Run Count within Each Picture Comparisons
Rape Picture Comparisons (Rape-Negative vs. Rape-Positive)
Empty Means, Random
Crossed Subjects and Items Conditional Model
Intercept Model
with Random Intercepts
Estimate SE
p
Estimate SE
p

Model Effects
Model for the Means
Intercept
Slide Type (neg-rape)
Victimization Group (singly victimized)
Victimization Group (revictimized)
Mood Condition (negative)
PTSD Total
Model for the Variance
Subject Random Intercept Variance
0.05
0.01 <.0001
Item Random Intercept Variance
0.05
0.02 0.02
Residual Variance
0.46
0.02 <.0001
Model Fit
Number of Parameters
3
REML –2LL
3074.6
REML AIC
3080.6
REML BIC
3074.6
95% Random Effects Confidence Intervals from Empty Means Random Intercept Model
Individual Subject Run Count Means
1.51 – 2.40
Individual Item Run Count Means
1.54 – 2.37

1.94
-0.01
-0.02
0.06
0.03
0.001

0.12
<.0001
0.15
0.97
0.06
0.78
0.08
0.47
0.05
0.55
0.002 0.82

0.05
0.05
0.46

0.03
0.03
0.02

0.03
0.03
<.0001
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Positive Picture Comparisons (Positive-Negative vs. Positive-Rape)
Empty Means, Random
Crossed Subjects and Items Conditional Model
Intercept Model
with Random Intercepts
Estimate SE
p
Estimate SE
p

Model Effects
Model for the Means
Intercept
Slide Type (pos-neg)
Victimization Group (singly victimized)
Victimization Group (revictimized)
Mood Condition (negative)
PTSD Total
Model for the Variance
Subject Random Intercept Variance
0.07
0.01
<.0001
Item Random Intercept Variance
0.09
0.03
<.001
Residual Variance
0.48
0.01
<.0001
Model Fit
Number of Parameters
3
REML –2LL
7161.7
REML AIC
7167.7
REML BIC
7161.7
95% Random Effects Confidence Intervals from Empty Means Random Intercept Model
Individual Subject Run Count Means
1.55 – 2.59
Individual Item Run Count Means
1.48 – 2.65

2.14
-0.05
-0.07
-0.01
-0.004
-0.002

0.15
0.16
0.06
0.07
0.05
0.002

<.0001
0.76
0.27
0.87
0.93
0.47

0.07
0.09
0.48

0.01
0.03
0.01

<.0001
<.001
<.0001
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Negative Picture Comparisons (Negative-Rape vs. Negative-Positive)
Empty Means, Random
Crossed Subjects and Items Conditional Model
Intercept Model
with Random Intercepts
Estimate SE
p
Estimate SE
p

Model Effects
Model for the Means
Intercept
Slide Type (neg-rape)
Victimization Group (singly victimized)
Victimization Group (revictimized)
Mood Condition (negative)
PTSD Total
Model for the Variance
Subject Random Intercept Variance
0.09
0.01 <.0001
Item Random Intercept Variance
0.08
0.02 <.001
Residual Variance
0.45
0.01 <.0001
Model Fit
Number of Parameters
3
REML –2LL
7000.2
REML AIC
7006.2
REML BIC
7000.2
95% Random Effects Confidence Intervals from Empty Means Random Intercept Model
Individual Subject First Fixation Time Means
1.60 – 2.78
Individual Item First Fixation Time Means
1.65 – 2.73

2.21
-0.09
-0.003
0.03
-0.003
0.0004

0.09 <.0001
0.14 0.53
0.06
0.96
0.08
0.73
0.06
0.95
0.002 0.89

0.09
0.08
0.45

0.01
0.03
0.01

<.0001
<.001
<.0001

Note. Bold values are p < .05.
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Analyses yielded no significant main effects for item or subject predictors on
run count for rape pictures when paired with positive or negative pictures. Survivors,
irrespective of their revictimization status and PTSD symptom levels, did not differ
from nonvictims in how often they returned to the rape pictures. Thus, there was zero
reduction in the item variation and the subject variation in run count, indicating that
the variability in preferential run count for rape pictures across participants and
pictures was unaccounted for by the predictors in the current study.
Summary. The findings from conditional models revealed that participants did
not differ in how often they returned to the rape pictures, suggesting that sexually
victimized women did not show frequent returns to visual trauma-related stimuli than
nonvictims as predicted. Moreover, survivors’ revictimization status and PTSD
symptoms, their mood condition, and the contrasting picture that was paired with rape
pictures did not predict frequent run count for trauma-related stimuli.
Crossed Random Effects Models for Positive Picture Comparisons
First fixation time. Compared to the empty means, random subjects model,
the better fitting random items and subjects model indicated that there was significant
variability in first fixation time for positive pictures across participants, −2ΔLL(~1) =
15.5, p < .001, and across pictures, −2ΔLL(~1) = 1087.1, p < .001, such that 4% of the
total variation in first fixation time was due to systematic mean differences across
participants, 30.28% was due to mean differences across pictures, and the remaining
66.03% was due to participant by picture interaction. Random intercepts for both
participants and pictures along with residual variance were retained for subsequent
predictor analyses.
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The findings from the final crossed random effects conditional model (see
Table 2) indicated that there were no significant main effects or interactions of item or
subject predictors on first fixation time for positive pictures when paired with
contrasting pictures. There was zero reduction in the item variation and 1% reduction
in the subject variation in first fixation time. Thus, the variability in preferential first
fixation time for positive pictures across participants and pictures was unaccounted for
by the predictors used in this study.
Summary. The findings from conditional models revealed that victimization
and the presence of PTSD symptomatology did not predict first fixation time for
positive pictures.
First run dwell time. Compared to the empty means, random subjects model,
the better fitting random items and subjects model indicated that there was significant
variability in first run dwell time for positive pictures across participants, −2ΔLL(~1)
= 206.7, p < .0001, and across pictures, −2ΔLL(~1) = 606.8, p < .0001, such that
12.37% of the total variation in first run dwell time was due to systematic mean
differences across participants, 17.27% was due to mean differences across pictures,
and the remaining 70.36% was due to participant by picture interaction. Random
intercepts for both participants and pictures along with residual variance were retained
for subsequent predictor analyses.
In the current study, we also explored participants’ first fixation time for
positive pictures in a series of crossed random effects conditional models to detect the
effects of predictors. The findings from the analyses exploring participants’ first run
dwell time for positive pictures (see Table 3) indicated that there were no significant
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main effects or interactions of item or subject predictors on first run dwell time for
positive pictures when paired with contrasting pictures. There was zero reduction in
the item variation and 0.8% reduction in the subject variation in first run dwell time.
Thus, a significant proportion of variability in preferential first run dwell time for
positive pictures across participants and across pictures remains unaccounted for by
the predictors used in this study.
Summary. Taken together, the results from conditional models revealed that
victimization and the presence of PTSD symptomatology did not predict first run
dwell time for positive pictures.
Dwell time. Compared to the empty means, random subjects model, the better
fitting random items and subjects model indicated that there was significant variability
in dwell time for positive pictures across participants, −2ΔLL(~1) = 120.8, p < .0001,
and across pictures, −2ΔLL(~1) = 470.4, p < .0001, such that 8.81% of the total
variation in dwell time was due to systematic mean differences across participants,
14.57% was due to mean differences across pictures, and the remaining 76.62% was
due to participant by picture interaction. Random intercepts for both participants and
pictures along with residual variance were retained for subsequent predictor analyses.
The findings from the final crossed random effects conditional model for dwell
time for positive pictures (see Table 4) indicated that there was a significant main
effect of PTSD total symptom score on survivors’ dwell time for positive pictures,
indicating that survivors differed in how long they spent looking at positive pictures
depending on their PTSD total symptom score, F(1, 137) = 6.39, p = .01. Specifically,
survivors spent 4.43 ms less time looking at positive pictures with every one-unit
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increase in their PTSD total symptom score from the average PTSD score, indicating
that survivors with high PTSD symptoms had fewer problems disengaging and
switching from positive pictures.
Of the three PTSD symptom clusters (results are not included in Table 4), reexperiencing and avoidance/numbing symptoms appeared to matter most for survivors
as indicated by a significant main effect of cluster B on survivors’ dwell time for
positive pictures, F(1, 137) = 5.45, p = .02, and a significant main effect of cluster C
score on survivors’ dwell time for positive pictures, F(1, 137) = 6.41, p = .01.
Specifically, survivors looked 11.72 ms less at positive pictures with every one-unit
increase in their re-experiencing symptom score from the average score of 10.
Survivors looked 9.98 ms less at positive pictures with every one-unit increase in their
avoidance/numbing symptom score from the average avoidance/numbing score of 10.
The symptom cluster D (hyperarousal) did not have a significant effect on survivors’
dwell time for positive pictures in the current sample, F(1, 137) = 3.51, p = .06.
There were no other significant main effects or interactions among different
predictors. The item predictor, slide type did not account for any item variation in
dwell time for positive pictures. The subject predictors, victimization, PTSD, and
mood condition, however, accounted for 5% of the subject variation in dwell time for
positive pictures. Therefore, a significant of variability in preferential dwell time for
positive pictures across participants and pictures remains unaccounted for by the
predictors used in this study.
Summary. The findings from conditional models revealed that higher levels of
PTSD symptomatology predicted less dwell time for positive visual stimuli among
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sexually victimized women. No other predictors accounted for the variability observed
across participants and across pictures.
Run count. Compared to the empty means, random subjects model, the better
fitting random items and subjects model indicated that there was significant variability
in run count for positive pictures, across participants, −2ΔLL(~1) = 176.6, p < .0001,
and across pictures, −2ΔLL(~1) = 457.1, p < .0001, such that 11.1% of the total
variation in run count was due to systematic mean differences across participants,
13.87% was due to mean differences across pictures, and the remaining 75.04% was
due to participant by picture interaction. Random intercepts for both participants and
pictures along with residual variance were retained for subsequent predictor analyses.
Sequential conditional models examining the effects of predictors on run count
for positive pictures (see Table 5) indicated that there were no significant main effects
or interactions of item or subject predictors. There was zero reduction in the item
variation and the subject variation in run count for positive pictures. Thus, the
variability in preferential run count for positive pictures across participants and
pictures that is unaccounted for by the predictors used in this study.
Summary. The findings from conditional models revealed that the predictors in
the model did not predict run count for positive stimuli.
Crossed Random Effects Models for Negative Picture Comparisons
First fixation time. Compared to the empty means, random subjects model,
the better fitting random items and subjects model indicated that there was significant
variability in first fixation time for negative pictures across participants, −2ΔLL(~1) =
90, p < .001, and across pictures, −2ΔLL(~1) = 972.2, p < .001, such that 7.9% of the
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total variation in first fixation time was due to systematic mean differences across
participants, 26.54% was due to mean differences across pictures, and the remaining
65.56% was due to participant by picture interaction. Random intercepts for both
participants and pictures along with residual variance were retained for subsequent
predictor analyses.
The findings from the final crossed random effects conditional model for first
fixation time for negative pictures (see Table 2) indicated that there were no
significant main effects or interactions of item or subject predictors on first fixation
time for negative pictures when paired with contrasting pictures. There was zero
reduction in the item variation and the subject variation in first fixation time. Thus, the
variability in preferential first fixation time for negative pictures across participants
and pictures is unaccounted for by the predictors used in this study.
Summary. The findings from conditional models revealed that the predictors in
the model did not predict first fixation time for negative pictures.
First run dwell time. Compared to the empty means, random subjects model,
the better fitting random items and subjects model indicated that there was significant
variability in first run dwell time for negative pictures, across participants, −2ΔLL(~1)
= 244.7, p < .001, and across pictures, −2ΔLL(~1) = 753.7, p < .001, such that 13.87%
of the total variation in first run dwell time was due to systematic mean differences
across subjects, 20.25% was due to mean differences across items, and the remaining
65.88% was due to subject by item interaction. Random intercepts for both
participants and pictures along with residual variance were retained for subsequent
predictor analyses.
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The findings from the final crossed random effects conditional model for first
run dwell time for negative pictures (see Table 3) indicated that there were no
significant main effects or interactions of item or subject predictors on first run dwell
time for negative pictures when paired with contrasting pictures. There was 3.7%
reduction in the item variation and zero reduction in the subject variation in first run
dwell time. Thus, a significant proportion of variability in preferential first run dwell
time for negative pictures across participants and across pictures remains unaccounted
for by the predictors used in this study.
Summary. The findings from conditional models revealed that victimization
and the presence of PTSD symptomatology did not predict first run dwell time for
positive pictures.
Dwell time. Compared to the empty means, random subjects model, the better
fitting random items and subjects model indicated that there was significant variability
in dwell time for negative pictures across participants, −2ΔLL(~1) = 88.7, p < .0001,
and across pictures, −2ΔLL(~1) = 571.3, p < .0001, such that 7.5% of the total
variation in dwell time was due to systematic mean differences across participants,
17.35% was due to mean differences across pictures, and the remaining 75.18% was
due to participant by picture interaction. Random intercepts for both participants and
pictures along with residual variance were retained for subsequent predictor analyses.
The findings from the final crossed random effects conditional model for dwell
time for negative pictures (see Table 4) indicated that there was a significant main
effect of slide type on participants’ dwell time for negative pictures, such that
participants showed overall differences in how long they spent looking at negative
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pictures when paired with positive pictures versus rape pictures, F(1, 21) = 9.42, p =
.01. Specifically, participants spent 436.74 ms less time looking at negative pictures
when paired with rape pictures as opposed to positive pictures. There were no other
significant main effects or interactions among different predictors. The item predictor,
slide type accounted for 28.5% of the item variation in dwell time for negative
pictures. The subject predictors, victimization, PTSD, and mood condition, however,
only accounted for 0% of the subject variation in dwell time for negative pictures.
Therefore, a significant proportion of variability in preferential dwell time for negative
pictures across participants and pictures remains unaccounted for by the predictors
used in this study.
Summary. The findings from conditional models revealed that participants
dwelled less on negative pictures when these were paired with rape pictures rather
than positive pictures, indicating that all women displayed less difficulty disengaging
from negative stimuli when presented with trauma-related stimuli. No other predictors
accounted for the variability observed across participants and across pictures.
Run count. Compared to the empty means, random subjects model, the better
fitting random items and subjects model indicated that there was significant variability
in run count for negative pictures, across participants, −2ΔLL(~1) = 271.7, p < .0001,
and across pictures, −2ΔLL(~1) = 413.4, p < .0001, such that 14.5% of the total
variation in run count was due to systematic mean differences across participants,
12.27% was due to mean differences across pictures, and the remaining 73.21% was
due to participant by picture interaction. Random intercepts for both participants and
pictures along with residual variance were retained for subsequent predictor analyses.
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Sequential conditional models examining the effects of predictors on run count
for negative pictures (see Table 5) indicated that there were no significant main effects
or interactions of item or subject predictors. There was zero reduction in the item
variation and the subject variation in run count for negative pictures. Thus, the
variability in preferential run count for negative pictures across participants and
pictures that is unaccounted for by the predictors used in this study.
Summary. The findings from conditional models revealed that the predictors in
the model did not predict run count for negative stimuli.
Generalized Linear Mixed Modeling to Examine Changes in the Probability of
Fixation on Rape Pictures across Trial Duration
Part three of this study examined whether participants’ fixations on the rape
picture of the pair of stimuli varied across the five-second trial duration and whether
sexual victimization predicted these variations (hypothesis 3). Specifically, it was
expected that all women, regardless of their victimization history, would initially
display similar likelihood to fixate on the rape picture. However, revictimized women
would display progressively less fixations on the rape picture across trial duration
whereas women with single victimization experience or no victimization would
display faster decline in fixations on the rape picture across trial duration.
The outcome variable for this analysis is a binary variable that records whether
the fixation at a time point was on the rape picture or not. A generalized linear mixed
model was estimated to account for the binary outcome variable where the assumption
of continuous scores and the normality assumption are violated (Hox, 2010). In
utilizing this growth modeling, the non-normal outcome variable was transformed into
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continuous variable using a logit link function that represents the natural logarithm of
odds ratio (i.e., log of the odds of the probability of one) where predictors are
combined in a linear combination to predict the link-transformed outcome.
The first step in the analyses was to determine whether there was significant
within-cluster interdependence to warrant the use of a multilevel approach. A
Pearson’s correlation coefficient between binary outcome variable (which indicates
whether participants’ fixation was on rape picture or not) and time of fixation for each
slide type (e.g., rape-positive and rape-negative) was obtained using PROC CORR
procedure. Then, models were estimated for rape picture slides using PROC
GLIMMIX procedure and Laplace method in SAS. First, an unconditional model with
random intercept for persons and slides model that predicts no change in the outcome
variable on average was assessed as a baseline model for comparison of fit of
subsequent models. Thereafter, fixed effects of predictors (victimization and slide
type) as well as fixed and random effects of time were added sequentially and
analyzed. In this study, fixations were nested within slides, which were nested within
persons, and time was centered such that 0 indicated the start of a trial. Therefore,
random effects associated with level-1 fixation time were examined for convergence at
level 2 (i.e., slide within person) and level 3 (i.e., person) to assess whether the effect
of predictors varies over slides and persons. For each model that includes random
slopes for time, random slopes are added in level 2 RANDOM statement first, which if
significant, was subsequently added in level 3. The significance of random effects was
evaluated using −2ΔLL tests and information criteria between models with the same
fixed effects. The significance of fixed effects was evaluated using Wald test (p < .05).
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For rape picture comparisons, an unconditional model with random intercept
for persons and slides model was estimated first, in which the fixed intercept indicated
that the expected logit of participants’ fixation being on rape pictures at any occasion
across trial duration was 0.12 (i.e., 52.9% probability). The intraclass correlation
(ICC) indicated that approximately 0% of the residual variance was due to systematic
between-subject differences, 8% was due to systematic between-slide variation, and
the remaining 92% represented subject by slide interaction. Computation of 95%
confidence intervals for the random variation around each fixed effect indicated that
95% of individual subject means for fixations on rape pictures were expected to fall
between 0.51 and 0.55, and 95% of the individual item means for fixations on rape
pictures were expected to fall between 0.28 and 0.76.
A fixed linear effect of time and fixed effects of victimization and slide type
were added to the model that yielded significant effects. The addition of a random
linear slope did not improve the model fit. The fixed linear random intercept model
was re-estimated after removing nonsignificant interaction terms, which generated
slightly smaller AIC term and comparable BIC term.
The parameters of the best-fitting fixed linear random intercept model (see
Table 6) included a fixed intercept that indicated that the expected logit of
participants’ fixation being on rape pictures at the start of trial was 0.62 (and where all
other variables are zero; that is, this was the intercept for rape-positive slide type and
non-victims). That is, the probability of participants’ fixation being on rape picture at
the start of trial is 65%. The fixed linear time slope was significant, F(1, 22326) =
33.83, p < .001, indicating that the logit of linear rate of change in participants’
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fixation being on rape pictures at the start of trial was -0.10. That is, the probability of
participants’ fixation being on rape picture is 65% at the start of a trial, and the logit of
a 1 decreased 0.10 per unit time (see Figure 1).

Table 6
Model Parameters for the Best-fitting Model for Five-second Fixation Data for Rape Picture Comparisons
Rape Picture Comparisons (Rape-Negative vs. Rape-Positive)
Fixed Linear, Random Intercept Model
Estimate
SE
p

Model Effects
Model for the Means
Intercept
Linear
Victimization Group (singly victimized)
Victimization Group (revictimized)
Slide Type (rape-neg)
Linear*Slide Type (rape-neg)
Model for the Variance
Subject Intercept Variance
Item Intercept Variance
Residual Variance
Model Fit
Number of Parameters
LAPLACE -2LL
LAPLACE AIC
LAPLACE BIC

0.62
-0.10
-0.05
0.02
-0.70
0.09
0.009
0.23
3.29

0.05
0.01
0.05
0.06
0.06
0.02

<.001
<.001
0.29
0.69
<.001
<.001

0.007
0.02

8
32124.74
32140.74
32164.39

Note. Time was centered at the start of trial. Bold values are p < .05.
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Figure 1. Probability for linear slope of time by slide type interaction for rape picture comparisons.
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The effect of victimization was nonsignificant, p = .33, indicating that, unlike
our prediction, there were no significant differences among participants in the logit of
their fixation being on rape pictures across trial duration due to their victimization. We
also explored whether slide type predicted differences in the outcome and the results
indicated that the effect of slide type was significant, F(1, 22326) = 138.67, p < .001,
such that there were differences among participants in the logit of their fixation being
on rape pictures depending on whether rape pictures were paired with positive pictures
as opposed to negative pictures. Specifically, for rape-negative trials, as compared to
rape-positive trials, the logit of fixation being on rape pictures at the start of a trial was
lower by 0.70 per second. That is, at the start of the trial, participants were less likely
to fixate on rape pictures when these were paired with negative pictures as opposed to
positive pictures.
Further, the significant interaction term between linear slope and slide type
indicates that for rape-negative slides, as the trial progresses, slide type has a less
negative effect such that the logit of fixation being on the rape picture becomes less
negative by 0.09 per second. That is, the probability of participants’ fixation for rape
pictures was constant across trial duration, when paired with negative pictures.
Summary. Contrary to hypothesis 3, there were no differences in fixations for
rape pictures by victimization, indicating that all women, regardless of their
victimization history, displayed the same extent of fixation for rape pictures. However,
there was a statistical difference for fixation by slide type where participants showed
higher fixation probabilities for rape pictures paired with positive pictures than rape
pictures with negative pictures, at the start of the trial. As seen in Figure 1, there was
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also an interaction effect such that when rape pictures were paired with negative
pictures, the probability of participants’ fixation for rape pictures was constant across
trial duration. When rape pictures were paired with positive pictures, the probability of
participants’ fixation for rape pictures was high at the start of the trial and the
probability of their fixation for rape pictures decreased over trial duration. Together,
these results suggest that all women manifested an attentional bias away from the
trauma-related stimuli over the course of a rape-positive trial, which was reflective of
attentional avoidance of trauma-related stimuli over time.
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Chapter 5: Discussion
Overview
Sexual victimization survivors may evidence an increased risk for developing
attentional biases to personally salient emotional stimuli such as trauma-related stimuli
(Fani et al., 2010; Foa et al., 1991; Pineles et al., 2009). However, the precise nature of
these attentional biases among sexual victimization survivors remains unclear, and
even less is known about factors that may predict these biases. Prior studies that have
drawn inferences about attentional processing in various trauma populations have
utilized methods that captured a snapshot of survivors’ attention to one stimulus
presented at a time. What seems more probable, however, is that people attend to
multiple intelligible stimuli at a time, but show preferential attentional allocation to
certain stimuli over others. Furthermore, in spite of the proposition that attention may
vary moment-to-moment, studies have not used methodology to assess the time course
of biased attentional patterns by monitoring continuous eye movements to salient
emotional stimuli. Thus, the current study applied an eyetracking methodology in
college women where trauma-related stimuli (i.e., “rape pictures” with themes related
to sexual victimization) and non-trauma stimuli (i.e., positive pictures and general
negative pictures) were presented in pairs for five seconds at a time, to draw accurate
conclusions regarding the preferential and varying nature of attentional bias in female
survivors of sexual victimization.
Using an ecologically valid visual task in the form of eyetracking, this study
evaluated whether college women reporting sexual victimization manifest specific
attentional behavior patterns to trauma-related, rape pictures. Specifically, eyetracking
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allowed us to investigate preferential orienting toward trauma-related stimuli by
assessing survivors’ first fixation time, which is the amount of time that elapses
following the start of each trial until the first fixation on each picture. We predicted
that revictimized women, when compared to singly victimized women and
nonvictims, were more likely to fixate on the rape picture first independent of the nontrauma picture of the pair. Next, survivors’ first run dwell time for rape pictures was
assessed from the total duration of fixations made during the first gaze fixation on the
rape picture of the pair of stimuli before fixating away from it, to understand their
initial attentional engagement to trauma-related stimuli. We predicted that
revictimized women, when compared to singly victimized women and nonvictims,
were more likely to dwell longer on the rape picture during first fixation independent
of the non-trauma picture in the pair. Survivors’ average dwell time and run count for
rape pictures were also assessed to determine whether the rape picture of the pair of
stimuli would continue to hold survivors’ attention, which may be indicative of
prolonged engagement to trauma-related stimuli. We predicted that compared to singly
victimized women and nonvictims, survivors would be preoccupied with the rape
picture by dwelling longer on it and frequently returning to it independent of the nontrauma picture in the pair. Exploratory analyses also investigated survivors’ first
fixation time, first run dwell time, average dwell time, and run count for other
emotional, but non-trauma, stimuli such as positive and general negative pictures. The
associations between specific attentional behavior patterns and PTSD symptomatology
in survivors were also examined to determine whether PTSD is one factor that may
predict sexually victimized women’s disruptions in attention to emotional stimuli. We
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also expected that survivors higher in PTSD symptoms would display similar
attentional patterns when compared to survivors lower in PTSD symptoms. Finally,
the current study also explored whether attentional patterns toward the rape picture
changes over time by capturing the probability of survivors’ fixation being on the rape
picture across trial duration. We expected that sexually victimized women would
display show progressively less fixations on trauma-related stimuli over time. The
major conclusions from this study are discussed as follows.
Do Sexually Victimized Women Display Attentional Biases for Rape Pictures?
Contrary to expectations, sexually victimized women (those with
revictimization experiences or higher PTSD symptoms) did not exhibit the predicted
attentional deployment patterns for rape pictures. In other words, sexually victimized
women did not show faster preferential orientation of their gaze toward trauma-related
stimuli. They also did not show a heightened tendency to look longer at trauma-related
stimuli when compared to non-victimized women. These findings were irrespective of
survivors’ revictimization status and PTSD symptoms.
Although contradicting prior findings among general trauma populations, a
few recent studies have yielded similar results. In Fani et al.’s dot-probe study (2010),
adult survivors of childhood sexual, physical, or emotional abuse showed an
attentional bias toward happy faces, relative to neutral faces, but showed no attentional
bias toward or away from threatening faces. The combat veterans in Kimble et al.’s
sample who were higher in PTSD symptoms were statistically indistinguishable from
those lower in PTSD symptoms with regard to attentional biases for trauma-related
stimuli assessed using an eyetracking task.
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As the absence of any attentional biases for rape pictures is unexpected, the
validity of this null finding should be considered. First, we used rape pictures that did
not receive affective valence and arousal ratings. It is possible that these
unstandardized rape pictures were not perceived as sufficiently threatening by
survivors to produce the expected pattern of results. It may be that these traumarelated stimuli may not have readily activated survivors’ trauma-related fear networks
to capture and hold attention. Another related explanation is the ambiguous nature of
the rape pictures used. In fact, it is not clear whether some of the rape pictures
resembled sexual victimization, physical violence, or atypical sexual acts, and this
lack of clarity may have elicited similar attentional responses from both survivors and
nonvictims. Evidence in support of this suggests that certain attentional patterns may
not be manifested with use of more ambiguous threatening stimuli (Koster, Crombez,
Verschuere, Van Damme, & Wiersema, 2006). Furthermore, our findings may
represent a generalized response to the rape pictures in all participants, such as was
observed in Freeman and Beck’s study (2000), perhaps due to the emotional relevance
of sexuality to undergraduate women. Although we had ten undergraduate students
(non-participants) rate whether the rape pictures were related to sexual violence or
general aggression, these picture ratings were performed by relatively healthy
students. It is likely that these pictures are conceptualized differently by students with
multiple sexual victimization experiences and higher PTSD levels. Therefore, material
that mapped more closely to survivors’ idiosyncratic notions of threat might show
more differential effects. Another explanation may be that there was a strong
competition between attention towards different emotional stimuli. Studies have
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shown that preferential cognitive processing of threatening stimuli is virtually absent
under conditions of high attention-demanding tasks (Pessoa, McKenna, Gutierrez, &
Ungerleider, 2002), such as when two emotional pictures are presented
simultaneously. It is also possible that choosing college students as our sample may
have attenuated group differences. Use of a more functionally impaired clinical
sample of survivors as opposed to an undergraduate sample may demonstrate greater
attentional biases for trauma-related stimuli. Although the current findings warrant
replication, they suggest that survivors and nonvictims in this sample show similar
abilities in detecting high value, trauma-specific threat in their environment, assessing
the relevance of such stimuli to their current goal (i.e., an experimental task to rate
pleasantness of the just-viewed picture), and disengaging from them without showing
exaggerated responses.
Although victimization history and PTSD symptomatology were not
significant predictors of attentional biases for rape pictures, the women in the study
did show longer first run dwell time and longer dwell time on average for rape pictures
when these were paired with positive pictures than generally negative ones. This
suggests that, once fixated, trauma-related stimuli may be more prone to receive gaze
fixations and hold people’s attention, when these were paired with affectively
incongruent positive stimuli than affectively congruent general negative stimuli. Other
studies that have also concurrently presented emotional stimuli have indicated that
affectively incongruent stimuli (i.e., a positive stimulus embedded in a sequence of
negative stimuli) elicit substantially greater brain responses (e.g., P300) than
affectively congruent (i.e., all negative or all positive) stimuli (e.g., Crites, Cacioppo,
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Gardner, & Berntson, 1995), suggesting that greater attentional processing may be
involved in rape-positive (incongruent) trials than rape-negative (congruent) trials.
Moreover, the greater initial attentional engagement and prolonged attentional
engagement in rape pictures in incongruent trials could be the consequence of
differences in valence and arousal level between trauma-related and positive stimuli.
Indeed, there is substantial empirical literature that postulates that stimuli
automatically evaluated as negative are more likely to be attended to than those
evaluated as pleasant or positive (Pratto & John, 1991), with stronger effects observed
for more extreme negative stimuli than milder ones (Mogg et al., 2000; Schimmack,
2005). Additionally, several studies have reported that highly relevant and arousing
stimuli capture greater attention (Bradley, Codispoti, Cuthbert, & Lang, 2001; Lang,
Greenwald, Bradley, & Hamm, 1993). Accordingly, perhaps the women in the current
sample perceived the rape pictures as more arousing than positive stimuli, and showed
greater attention to the rape pictures when these were competing with positive
pictures. Similarly-valenced rape and negative pictures, however, may not have
differed in the level of arousal as much as rape and positive pictures. Thus, the present
results suggest that attentional bias in the form of longer first run dwell time and
overall dwell time appears to be sensitive to not only the emotional properties (i.e.,
valence and arousal) of the trauma-related stimulus, but also to the emotional context
in which this stimulus is presented.
Do Sexually Victimized Women Display Attentional Biases to Other Emotional
Visual Stimuli?
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Prior research suggests that attentional biases are not only evidenced for
trauma-related stimuli, but also for other emotional stimuli, in various trauma
populations such as physical and emotional abuse in childhood (Fani et al., 2010; Gibb
et al., 2009). Although not part of the primary hypotheses, the current study examined
if this held true for sexually victimized women by detecting their biased attentional
processing of positive pictures and general negative pictures.
No significant differences emerged in participants’ attentional patterns for
general negative pictures, indicating that survivors in the current sample, irrespective
of their PTSD symptom levels, did not show facilitated attention or prolonged
engagement toward any negative (trauma-related or general negative) stimuli in the
eyetracking task. Although sexual victimization experiences across the lifespan may
have compromised survivors’ ability to recognize, understand, and differentiate
emotional information (Polusny, Dickinson, Murdoch, & Thuras, 2008), this did not
seem to be the case here, given that survivors and non-victimized women obtained
similar results for both rape pictures and general negative pictures. However, similar
to the findings regarding rape pictures, participants were more likely to dwell on
general negative pictures for longer time on average, when general negative pictures
were paired with positive pictures than rape pictures. Thus, once fixated, general
negative stimuli may be more prone to receive gaze fixations and hold people’s
attention, when these were paired with affectively incongruent positive stimuli. As
noted previously, affective incongruency of negative-positive trials may have
produced these results.
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Although there were no overall differences among participants, there was
significant variability within sexually victimized women with regard to their dwell
time for positive pictures. Specifically, survivors higher in PTSD symptoms
(intrusions, avoidance/numbing, and hyperarousal symptoms) were less likely to dwell
on positive pictures independent of the contrasting picture in the pair, compared to
survivors with low levels of PTSD symptoms. This finding is consistent with Gibb et
al.’s dot-probe study (2009) that reported that adult survivors of childhood
victimization (including sexual victimization) displayed a tendency to show attentional
avoidance of happy faces. Together, these studies indicate that victimization
experiences may be related to biases for other emotional information. One explanation
for this finding may be that high PTSD survivors may expend so much cognitive,
emotional, and behavioral effort attempting to manage their intrusion and
hypervigilance symptoms that they exhaust or deplete their emotional resources,
which leads to diminished ability to attend to and use positive information and
experience positive emotions (Foa, Zinbarg, & Rothbaum, 1992). Relatedly, it appears
that survivors with high levels of PTSD symptoms may experience some difficulties
up-regulating their positive emotions as evidenced by their diminished interest in
expanding their attention toward positive aspects in their environment. However,
preferential attention toward pleasant stimuli in the presence of unpleasant stimuli has
been shown to elicit positive emotional state (i.e., up-regulate positive affect) and
facilitate further adaptive coping (Joormann & Gotlib, 2007; Wadlinger & Isaacowitz,
2008). This reduced attention to positive stimuli among survivors higher in PTSD
symptoms, however, may impede the process of their adaptive emotion regulation.
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This finding suggests that high levels of PTSD symptoms in survivors may also be
related to biased processing of emotional stimuli other than trauma-related stimuli.
Does Attentional Bias to Rape Pictures Vary Across Trial Duration and Does
Sexual Victimization Predict these Variations?
Relatively few studies have monitored continuous eye movements while
participants viewed pairs of pictures in order to understand the time course of attention
deployment (e.g., Nummenmaa, Hyönä, & Calvo, 2006). Results from these studies
have shown that the nature of attentional bias may vary according to the stage of
information processing. Early stages, for example, reveal processes such as fast
detection of or engagement on a stimulus of interest whereas later stages manifest
more strategic processes such as delayed disengagement and attentional avoidance of
the stimulus (Cisler & Koster, 2010). In this study, we predicted that all women,
regardless of their victimization history, would initially display similar likelihood to
fixate on the rape picture. However, sexually revictimized women would display
progressively less fixations on the rape picture across trial duration whereas women
with single victimization experience and no victimization would display faster decline
in fixations on the rape picture across trial duration.
Results suggest that participants showed changes in fixation patterns for rape
pictures across rape picture trials, but that sexual victimization history did not predict
these biases in eye movements. At the start of trial, participants were more likely to
fixate on rape pictures that were paired with positive pictures than negative pictures.
This finding is partially consistent with predictions and reflects participants’ bias in
early attentional engagement toward rape pictures particularly amidst affectively
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incongruent (i.e., positive) stimuli. Further, the fixations on the rape pictures remained
the same for trials where these were paired with negative pictures. In trials where the
rape pictures were paired with positive pictures, however, participants’ fixations on
the rape pictures steadily decreased as time progressed. This reflects participants’
attentional avoidance of rape pictures when affectively different stimuli were
available. In essence, all women in the study displayed an overall attentional bias
away from rape pictures (i.e., toward positive pictures) across trial duration in
response to rape-positive pairings. Previous eye movement studies have demonstrated
a similar effect of attentional avoidance of threatening stimuli at long stimulus
durations among different anxious populations (Calvo & Avero, 2005; Pflugshaupt et
al., 2005; Rohner, 2002). However, there was no evidence from the present study that
sexual victimization has an independent influence on attentional avoidance of rape
pictures in the form of gaze fixations. One reason for this lack of finding may be that
we used a relatively high functioning group of participants in our sample—college
women—that may not have permitted the detection of between group differences.
Furthermore, we cannot conclude whether attentional avoidance of rape pictures is
necessarily a maladaptive phenomenon, given that all participants exhibited this and
we did not examine whether specific attentional behavior patterns predicted emotional
problems. It may be that the participants did not perceive there was a “good” choice in
rape-negative slides and showed no change in fixations on the rape picture across the
time of the trial. In the rape-positive condition, participants may have perceived a
positive alternative to the rape picture, thus increasing the likelihood of looking away
from the rape picture across the time of the trial.
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Limitations
Interpretation of these results should be considered in the light of several
important limitations. One of the limitations is the use of unstandardized rape pictures
that were obtained from the public domain. Although undergraduate students rated
these rape pictures as having a sexual victimization theme as opposed to general
aggression, these were not matched with the general negative and positive IAPS
pictures in terms of affective valence and arousal ratings, complexity value, luminance
level, and color saturation. An advantage of this study, however, is that we used
interpersonal scenes that are shown to have greater emotional arousal than emotional
faces or words (Bradley et al., 2003) that were used in prior studies assessing
attentional biases among sexual victimization survivors. However, future research
should develop a database of standardized emotional interpersonal scenes that are
closely representative of survivors’ experiences, rated as salient by survivors, and
elicit negative emotions, for in vivo assessment of emotional attentional bias.
Next, because this study included only Midwestern college students, the
generalizability of findings to non-university and clinical populations is not known.
For instance, participants reporting sexual victimization experiences and high levels of
PTSD were likely functioning at a higher level than a clinical sample. Given their
enrollment in school, they may have downplayed the extent of their victimization
experiences and the extent to which any symptoms impacted on their functioning
abilities. It is possible that different attentional patterns may be manifested, for
example, among clinical samples with more severe PTSD symptomatology or PTSD
diagnosis. Therefore, although college women are an at-risk group for sexual
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victimization (Messman-Moore & Brown, 2006), further studies are necessary to
extend this body of research to other community and clinical samples of sexual
victimization survivors. Some caution is also warranted in interpreting the lack of
findings because of the relatively small and high functioning sample in this study,
which may have prevented detection of meaningful differences and clinically
important effects. Further studies are necessary to determine whether these findings
replicate in larger samples that include survivors from more varied backgrounds.
Another important limitation is that although the women classified as
nonvictims reported that they were not sexually abused during childhood/adolescence
or adulthood, they may have experienced other interpersonal traumas as children or as
adults (e.g., physical abuse). Further, we did not rule out or account for presence of
other traumas experienced by sexual victimization survivors in the sample. We also
did not assess the PTSD symptoms uniquely to experiences of sexual victimization,
making it possible that survivors may have reported symptoms that pertain to other
traumatic experiences. Studies contrasting survivors with different victimization
experiences have suggested that they differ in their early experiences of emotion
socialization as well as their capacities to recognize, express, and understand emotions
(Pollak et al., 2000). Moreover, drawing on Foa and Kozak’s theory, it is assumed that
survivors develop unique fear structures or schemas based on their traumatic
experience that may then differentially influence aspects of their attention. For
example, a sexually abused individual with physical abuse experience may attend
more to both rape pictures as well as pictures depicting general aggression such as a
threatening face, whereas another individual with only sexual abuse experience may
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preferentially attend only to rape pictures. Therefore, given how different types of
victimization tend to co-occur, we cannot rule out the influence of other interpersonal
traumas or victimizations among sexual victimization survivors, which may have
biased their attentional patterns.
Finally, in addition to assessing other trauma experiences, future research
might measure the severity and frequency of sexual victimization to determine their
possible effects on the emergence of attentional bias. Moreover, the current study
utilized participants regardless of whether they met the cut-off for a PTSD diagnosis.
Although mild levels of anxiety are sufficient for triggering attentional bias (Bar-Haim
et al., 2007), future studies should also examine PTSD symptom clusters in
relationship to attentional biases for trauma-related stimuli in survivors, comparing
those with PTSD diagnosis versus sub-threshold symptoms.
Research and Clinical Implications of This Study
Attentional biases to trauma-related stimuli have been suggested as a
mechanism that moderates emotion dysregulation among sexual victimization
survivors, yet studies using strong methodologies are scarce. The larger study from
which the present data are derived is perhaps the first study to examine sexual
victimization survivors’ attentional deployment in a continuous fashion using
eyetracking technology. The results from the current study highlight that sexual
victimization could uniquely influence people’s attentional processing of certain
emotional information, especially in the presence of high levels of PTSD symptoms.
Specifically, survivors in the current sample exhibited attentional avoidance of
positive stimuli, but, unlike several previous studies, did not show any attentional
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biases for trauma-related stimuli. This finding emphasizes that attention in sexual
victimization survivors with higher PTSD symptoms may involve biased processing of
emotional stimuli other than those related to their trauma. This finding is important for
sexual victimization survivors given the strong association of victimization with
emotion regulation difficulties (Kim & Cicchetti, 2009; Walsh, Galea, & Koenen,
2012) and the increasing recognition of emotion dysregulation as a mechanism that
accounts for linkages between early victimization to later revictimization and
psychopathology (Cloitre, Miranda, Stovall-McClough, & Han, 2005; Walsh, DiLillo,
& Messman-Moore, 2012). The connection between survivors’ selective inattention to
pleasant information and their emotion dysregulation, as well as its contribution to the
development and maintenance of PTSD symptoms need further examination.
The current study suggests that eyetracking can be a valuable method to draw
accurate conclusions regarding unique visual attentional patterns in sexual
victimization survivors. Although eyetracking does not directly measure attention, it
tracks eye movements that are the best proxy measures of visual attention. Moreover,
the eyetracking method offers several advantages compared to other techniques where
inferences must be made based on participants’ performance on secondary tasks. By
contrast, eyetracking allows measurement of different attentional patterns, by
capturing continuous overt eye movements when two pictures were presented
simultaneously. Accordingly, the attentional processes we found in our study may be
more characteristic of sexually victimized women, and should be replicated in further
studies using a similar advanced methodology.
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Findings from this study also have important practical therapeutic implications
for clinicians developing and implementing efficacious treatments for sexual
victimization survivors with PTSD symptomatology. Sexually victimized women who
experienced higher levels of PTSD symptomatology, including intrusions,
avoidance/numbing, and hyperarousal symptoms, displayed greater difficulties
shifting attention to pleasant aspects in the environment when compared to those with
lower levels of PTSD symptomatology. Selectively attending to certain affective
stimuli while actively disregarding others is one important mechanism through which
individuals may regulate their emotions (Gross, 1998). For example, exhibiting
attentional bias favoring emotionally positive information has been linked to effective
emotion regulation (Wadlinger & Isaacowitz, 2008). It is likely that survivors with
high PTSD may become overinvested on managing their intrusions and hyperarousal
symptoms, which may then deplete their emotion regulation resources and result in
attempts to suppress internal or external experience of any emotions, including
positive ones. Therefore, survivors with high PTSD and those who are predisposed to
PTSD should not only be taught effective emotion regulation strategies to decrease
negative affect without getting overwhelmed, but they should also be taught adaptive
strategies to increase positive affect, such as by encouraging them to attend to positive
information in a situation or in their environment. In this regard, sexually victimized
women may also benefit from being taught effective reappraisal techniques for
emotion regulation, such as, for example, teaching them to reappraise the events or
stimuli with the goals to reduce negative affectivity and to redirect attention and
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energy to perception of more positive aspects and the present (Cloitre, Cohen, &
Koenen, 2006).
Our findings, in addition to recent work on attention bias modification
(attentional retraining) as an emerging intervention for anxiety disorders (see BarHaim, 2010, for a review), yield the hope of potentially treating sexually victimized
women with PTSD by modifying their attentional deployment in a laboratory context.
Current data also suggest the use of attentional bias modification as an adjunct to
traditional trauma-focused interventions, especially for those with higher PTSD
symptomatology or those who are predisposed to PTSD. Emerging research among
patients with PTSD suggests that modifying attentional bias toward and away from
trauma-related stimuli could regulate and normalize patients’ attentional control and
reduce risk for posttraumatic stress symptoms (Wald et al., 2011). Given that sexual
victimization poses significant risk to develop subsequent PTSD, the current results
highlight particular attentional patterns that could be investigated as an important
treatment focus for survivors. Typically, attentional retraining has attempted to train
participants to shift attention away from threatening stimuli, but our finding that
higher PTSD symptom levels in survivors were related to shorter dwell time for
positive stimuli indicate that it is important to identify unique pre-existing attentional
patterns and tailor training to alter these, which in our sample of survivors involves
attentional bias away from positive stimuli. Experimentally training individuals to
selectively attend to positive information has been found to attenuate their experience
of negative emotions under stress (Wadlinger & Isaacowitz, 2008). Individualizing
interventions to modify maladaptive attentional patterns also has important
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implications for predicting treatment outcomes as well as relapse post trauma-focused
treatment (Waters, Mogg, & Bradley, 2012). Taken together, it will be an interesting
and important research and clinical avenue to explore whether reduction of these
attentional biases by teaching emotion regulation skills as well as attentional
retraining, may reduce symptoms of PTSD and prevent later PTSD in sexually
victimized women.
Conclusion
In conclusion, the present study provides initial evidence for certain types of
attentional biases for emotional stimuli other than trauma-related stimuli in sexually
victimized college women. Specifically, the findings suggest that survivors may
exhibit an attentional bias away from positive stimuli, especially if they experience
higher symptoms associated with PTSD. This finding partly replicated evidence from
adult survivors of childhood victimization (Gibb et al., 2009). A history of sexual
victimization alone however did not predict any attentional biases in our sample. The
results suggest that future trauma-focused interventions should include attempts to
improve survivors’ emotion regulation skills as well as to retrain survivors’ attention
by targeting specific attentional patterns, not only for trauma-related stimuli, but also
for other emotional stimuli.
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Demographic Questionnaire

Instructions: Thank you for agreeing to participate in this study. You will be
answering several questions on the computer, many of which may seem repetitive, but
please try to read each question carefully. The first set of questions will ask about your
background. Please let the research assistant know if you have questions!
1. What is your current age? _____
2. Have you ever been married or are you currently living with someone?
(1) Never Married
(2) Married
(3) Cohabitating
(4) Divorced or separated
(5) Widowed
3. What is your religious affiliation, if any?
(1) Protestant (Baptist, Methodist, Lutheran, Church of Christ, etc.)
(2) Catholic
(3) Jewish
(4) Non-affiliated
(5) Other
4. What is your ethnicity?
(1) Caucasian/Euro-American
(2) African American
(3) Hispanic/Latino American
(4) Asian American
(5) Native American
(6) Hawaiian Islander
(7) Other
If other, please explain_________________________________
5. What is your sexual orientation?
Completely
Bisexual
Completely
Homosexual
Heterosexual
1
2
3
4
5
6. Are you currently a full time student?
(0) No
(1) Yes
7. What is your current household income?
(1) Less than $10,000
(7) Between $61,000 - $70,000
(2) Between $10,000 - $20,000
(8) Between $71,000 - $80,000
(3) Between $21,000 - $30,000
(9) Between $81,000 - $90,000
(4) Between $31,000 - $40,000
(10) Between $91,000- $100,000
(5) Between $41,000 - $50,000
(11) Between $100,000-$150,000
(6) Between $51,000 - $60,000
(12) Above $150,000
8. What was the average yearly household income in your family as you were growing up?
(1) Less than $10,000
(7) Between $61,000 - $70,000
(2) Between $10,000 - $20,000
(8) Between $71,000 - $80,000
(3) Between $21,000 - $30,000
(9) Between $81,000 - $90,000
(4) Between $31,000 - $40,000
(10) Between $91,000- $100,000
(5) Between $41,000 - $50,000
(11) Between $100,000-$150,000
(6) Between $51,000 - $60,000
(12) Above $150,000
9. Using the scale below, what was the highest level of education completed by your father? (By father
we mean the main male caregiver that you lived with as a child.) ________
(1) Less than high school
(2) Finished high school or obtained GED
(3) Some college
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(4) Two years of college
(5) Associate of Arts Degree
(6) M.F.A. Degree or equivalent
(7) BA or BS Degree
(8) Some graduate education
(9) Professional Degree (e.g. law)
(10) Master's Degree
(11) M.D. / Ph.D. / Ed.D.
10. Using the scale below, what was the highest level of education completed by your mother? (By
mother we mean the main female caregiver that you lived with as a child.) __________
(1) Less than high school
(2) Finished high school or obtained GED
(3) Some college
(4) Two years of college
(5) Associate of Arts Degree
(6) M.F.A. Degree or equivalent
(7) BA or BS Degree
(8) Some graduate education
(9) Professional Degree (e.g. law)
(10) Master's Degree
(11) M.D. / Ph.D. / Ed.D.
11. Using the scale below, what was your father’s occupation as you were growing up? _______
(1) Unemployed, dependent upon public assistance
(2) Farm laborer or Service Worker (e.g., dishwasher, car wash attendant, private house
cleaner)
(3) Unskilled Workers (e.g., bartender, garbage collectors, construction worker)
(4) Semiskilled Workers (e.g., animal caretakers, childcare providers, barbers/hairdressers, bus
driver, railroad conductors, meat cutters)
(5) Skilled workers (e.g., carpenters, electrician, firefighters, mail handlers, LPNs, railroad
engineers, police person or detectives)
(6) Small Business Owner Skilled Service Workers (e.g., auctioneers, bank tellers, dental
assistants, health trainers)
(7) Technicians or Semiprofessionals (e.g., advertising agent, air traffic controller, dental
hygienists, opticians, photographers, secretaries)
(8) Professionals/Administrators (e.g., accountants, clergymen, RNs, pharmacists, secondary
school teachers, pilots)
(9) Higher Executive/M.D or Ph.D. (e.g., astronomer, architect, civil engineers, attorneys,
psychologists, college or university professors)
12. Using the scale below, what was your mother's occupation as you were growing up? _______
(1) Unemployed, dependent upon public assistance
(2) Farm laborer or Service Worker (e.g., dishwasher, car wash attendant, private house
cleaner)
(3) Unskilled Workers (e.g., bartender, garbage collectors, construction worker)
(4) Semiskilled Workers (e.g., animal caretakers, childcare providers, barbers/hairdressers, bus
driver, railroad conductors, meat cutters)
(5) Skilled workers (e.g., carpenters, electrician, firefighters, mail handlers, LPNs, railroad
engineers, police person or detectives)
(6) Small Business Owner Skilled Service Workers (e.g., auctioneers, bank tellers, dental
assistants, health trainers)
(7) Technicians or Semiprofessionals (e.g., advertising agent, air traffic controller, dental
hygienists, opticians, photographers, secretaries)
(8) Professionals/Administrators (e.g., accountants, clergymen, RNs, pharmacists, secondary
school teachers, pilots)
(9) Higher Executive/M.D or Ph.D. (e.g., astronomer, architect, civil engineers, attorneys,
psychologists, college or university professors)
12. Before you were 18, did you ever live with anyone who abused alcohol on a regular basis?
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(0) No
(1) Yes
13. Before you were 18, did you ever live with anyone who abused other drugs like marijuana, cocaine,
prescription medication, or other substances?
(0) No
(1) Yes
14. Before you were 18, did anyone in your household have a mental illness such as depression, severe
anxiety, schizophrenia, manic-depression, or any other psychiatric illness?
(0) No
(1) Yes
15. Before you were 18, were your parents ever separated or divorced?
(0) No
(1) Yes
16. Before you were 18, was anyone you lived with ever put in jail for any reason?
(0) No
(1) Yes
17. Did either of your parents die before you reached the age of 18?
(0) No
(1) Yes
18. Were you ever in a life-threatening accident of any kind before you reached the age of 18?
(0) No
(1) Yes
19. Were you ever in a life-threatening tornado, hurricane, fire, or other natural disaster before you
reached the age of 18?
(0) No
(1) Yes
20. Before you reached the age of 18, were you ever the victim of a crime that resulted in physical
injury or that had the potential to be life-threatening?
(0) No
(1) Yes
21. To the best of your knowledge, were your parents or immediate caregivers ever investigated
because of a charge of child abuse or neglect?
(0) No
(1) Yes
22. Were you ever removed from your home because of abuse, neglect, or because your parents
financially unable to care for you?
(0) No, I was never removed from the home.
(1) Yes, once.
(2) Yes, two to five times.
(3) Yes, five to ten times.
23. What was the date of the first day of your last menstrual period? ______/_______/_______
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Childhood Trauma Questionnaire
Instructions: The following questions ask about some of your experiences growing up as a child and
teenager. For each statement, please select the number that best describes your experiences before the
age of 18. Even though some of the questions are very personal, please try to answer as honestly as
possible.
For each item, the response options are as follows:
1 = never true
2 = rarely true
3 = sometimes true
4 = often true
5 = very often true

1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
11
12
13
14
15
16
17
18
19
20
21
22
23
24
25
26
27
28

I didn't have enough to eat.
I knew there was someone to take care of me and protect me.
People in my family called me things like "stupid," "lazy," or "ugly."
My parents were too drunk or high to take care of the family.
There was someone in my family who helped me feel important or special.
I had to wear dirty clothes.
I felt loved.
I thought that my parents wished I had never been born.
I got hit so hard by someone in my family that I had to see a doctor or go to the
hospital.
There was nothing I wanted to change about my family.
People in my family hit me so hard that it left me with bruises or marks.
I was punished with a belt, a board, a cord, or some other hard object.
People in my family looked out for each other.
People in my family said hurtful or insulting things to me.
I believe that I was physically abused.
I had the perfect childhood.
I got hit or beaten so badly that it was noticed by someone like a teacher,
neighbor, or doctor.
I felt that someone in my family hated me.
People in my family felt close to each other.
Someone tried to touch me in a sexual way, or tried to make me touch them.
Someone threatened to hurt me or tell lies about me unless I did something
sexual with them.
I had the best family in the world.
Someone tried to make me do sexual things or watch sexual things.
Someone molested me.
I believe I was emotionally abused.
There was someone to take me to the doctor if I needed it.
I believe that I was sexually abused.
My family was a source of strength and support.
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Computer Assisted Maltreatment Inventory-Sexual Abuse Screener
It is now commonly known that many people have sexual experiences during childhood or adolescence.
These experiences may occur with other children, adolescents, or adults and can include a wide range of
behaviors including witnessing sexual activity, touching or being touched in a sexual way, and sexual
intercourse.
In this section we would like to ask you about some of the sexual experiences you may have had before
you turned 18. First, read through the list of sexual experiences below. Then, answer the following
three questions.


Someone intentionally exposed his or her genitals to you or masturbated in front
of you.



Someone kissed, touched, or fondled your body in a sexual way or you touched or fondled
them.



Someone attempted to have sexual intercourse with you (oral, anal, or vaginal).



You and another person actually had sexual intercourse (oral, anal, or vaginal).

1. Before you were 18, did ANY of the above ever happen with anyone against your will or when you
did not want it to happen?
(1) Yes
(2) No
2. Before you were 18, did ANY of the above ever happen with an immediate family member or other
relative? (Please EXCLUDE any voluntary sexual play that may have occurred with a similar age
peer—for example “playing doctor.”)
(1) Yes
(2) No
3. Before you were 18, did ANY of the above ever happen with anyone who was more than 5 years
older than you? (Please EXCLUDE any VOLUNTARY activities that occurred with a dating partner.)
(1) Yes
(2) No
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Modified Sexual Experiences Survey
Instructions: The following questions will ask about sexual experiences you have had since you turned
18. Please report experiences you have had EVEN IF they were NOT reported to police OR discussed
with family or friends. Please report experiences EVEN IF you do not feel they were very forceful OR
if they happened with boyfriends, friends, or husbands.
1
Have you ever had sexual intercourse?
0 = No 1 = Yes
 On how many different occasions has this occurred?
 How old were you when this occurred? If it occurred multiple times, what was your
age at the time when it bothered you most?
2
Have you ever had a man misinterpret the level of sexual intimacy you desired?
0 = No 1 = Yes
 On how many different occasions has this occurred?
 How old were you when this occurred? If it occurred multiple times, what was your
age at the time when it bothered you most?
3
Have you ever had sex with a man when you really didn't want to because he threatened to
end the relationship?
0 = No 1 = Yes
 On how many different occasions has this occurred?
 How old were you when this occurred? If it occurred multiple times, what was your
age at the time when it bothered you most?
4
Have you given into sex play (fondling, kissing, or petting, but not intercourse) when you
didn't want to because you were overwhelmed by a man's continual arguments and pressure?
0 = No 1 = Yes
 On how many different occasions has this occurred?
 How old were you when this occurred? If it occurred multiple times, what was your
age at the time when it bothered you most?
5
Have you had sex play (fondling, kissing, or petting, but not intercourse) because a man used
his position of authority (boss, teacher, camp couselor, supervisor) to make you?
0 = No 1 = Yes
 On how many different occasions has this occurred?
 How old were you when this occurred? If it occurred multiple times, what was your
age at the time when it bothered you most?
6
Have you had sex play (fondling, kissing, or petting, but not intercourse) when you didn't
want to because a man threatened or used some degree of physical force (twisting your arm,
holding you down) to make you?
0 = No 1 = Yes
 On how many different occasions has this occurred?
 How old were you when this occurred? If it occurred multiple times, what was your
age at the time when it bothered you most?
7
Have you given into oral sex (giving a blow job or going down, but not intercourse) when
you didn't want to because you were overwhelmed by a man's continual arguments and
pressure?
0 = No 1 = Yes
 On how many different occasions has this occurred?
 How old were you when this occurred? If it occurred multiple times, what was your
age at the time when it bothered you most?
8
Have you had oral sex (giving a blow job, going down, but not intercourse) when you didn't
want to because a man used his position of authority (boss, teacher, camp counselor,
supervisor) to make you?
0 = No 1 = Yes
 On how many different occasions has this occurred?
 How old were you when this occurred? If it occurred multiple times, what was your
age at the time when it bothered you most?
9
Have you had oral sex (giving a blow job or going down, but not intercourse) when you
didn't want to because you were incapable of giving consent or resisting due to alcohol or
drugs?
0 = No 1 = Yes
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10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

On how many different occasions has this occurred?
How old were you when this occurred? If it occurred multiple times, what was your
age at the time when it bothered you most?
Have you had oral sex (giving a blow job or going down, but not intercourse) when you
didn't want to because a man threatened or used some degree of physical force (twisting your
arm, holding you down, etc) to make you?
0 = No 1 = Yes
 On how many different occasions has this occurred?
 How old were you when this occurred? If it occurred multiple times, what was your
age at the time when it bothered you most?
Have you had a man attempt sexual intercourse (get on top of you, attempt to insert his penis)
when you didn't want to by threatening or using some degree of physical force (twisting your
arm, holding you down), but for some reason intercourse did not occur?
0 = No 1 = Yes
 On how many different occasions has this occurred?
 How old were you when this occurred? If it occurred multiple times, what was your
age at the time when it bothered you most?
Have you had a man attempt sexual intercourse (get on top of you, attempt to insert his penis)
when you didn't want to because you were incapable of giving consent or resisting due to
alcohol or drugs, but for some reason intercourse did not occur?
0 = No 1 = Yes
 On how many different occasions has this occurred?
 How old were you when this occurred? If it occurred multiple times, what was your
age at the time when it bothered you most?
Have you given into sexual intercourse when you didn't want to because you were
overwhelmed by a man's continual arguments and pressure?
0 = No 1 = Yes
 On how many different occasions has this occurred?
 How old were you when this occurred? If it occurred multiple times, what was your
age at the time when it bothered you most?
Have you had sexual intercourse when you didn't want to because a man used his position of
authority (boss, teacher, camp counselor, supervisor) to make you?
0 = No 1 = Yes
 On how many different occasions has this occurred?
 How old were you when this occurred? If it occurred multiple times, what was your
age at the time when it bothered you most?
Have you had sexual intercourse when you didn't want to because you were incapable of
giving consent or resisting due to alcohol or drugs?
0 = No 1 = Yes
 On how many different occasions has this occurred?
 How old were you when this occurred? If it occurred multiple times, what was your
age at the time when it bothered you most?
Have you had sexual intercourse when you didn't want to because a man threatened or used
some degree of physical force (twisting your arm, holding you down) to make you?
0 = No 1 = Yes
 On how many different occasions has this occurred?
 How old were you when this occurred? If it occurred multiple times, what was your
age at the time when it bothered you most?
Have you had sex acts (anal intercourse, vaginal or anal penetration by fingers or objects
other than the penis) when you didn't want to because you were incapable of giving consent
or resisting due to alcohol or drugs?
0 = No 1 = Yes
 On how many different occasions has this occurred?
 How old were you when this occurred? If it occurred multiple times, what was your
age at the time when it bothered you most?
Have you had sex acts (anal intercourse, vaginal or anal penetration by fingers or objects
other than the penis) when you didn't want to because a man threatened or used some degree
of physical force (twisting your arm, holding you down) to make you?
0 = No 1 = Yes
 On how many different occasions has this occurred?
 How old were you when this occurred? If it occurred multiple times, what was your
age at the time when it bothered you most?
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PTSD Checklist-Civilian Version
Instructions: Below is a list of problems and complaints that people sometimes have in response to
stressful experiences. Please read each one carefully and circle a number to indicate how much you
have been bothered by that problem in the past month.
1.

Repeated, disturbing memories, thoughts, or images of a stressful experience?
1
Not at all

2.

Not at all

Moderately

4
Quite a bit

5
Extremely

2
A little bit

3
Moderately

4
Quite a bit

5
Extremely

Suddenly acting or feeling as if a stressful experience were happening again (as if you were reliving
it)?
1
Not at all

4.

A little bit

3

Repeated, disturbing dreams of a stressful experience?
1

3.

2

2
A little bit

3
Moderately

4
Quite a bit

5
Extremely

Feeling very upset when something reminded you of a stressful experience?
1
Not at all

2
A little bit

3
Moderately

4
Quite a bit

5
Extremely

5. Having physical reactions (e.g., heart pounding, trouble breathing, sweating) when something
reminded you of a stressful experience?
1
Not at all
6.

A little bit

3
Moderately

4
Quite a bit

5
Extremely

Avoiding thinking about or talking about a stressful experience or avoiding having feelings related
to it?
1
Not at all

7.

2

2
A little bit

3
Moderately

4
Quite a bit

5
Extremely

Avoiding activities or situations because they reminded you of a stressful experience?
1
Not at all

2
A little bit

3
Moderately

4
Quite a bit

5
Extremely
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8.

Trouble remembering important parts of a stressful experience?
1
Not at all

9.

2
A little bit

3
Moderately

4
Quite a bit

5
Extremely

Loss of interest in activities that you used to enjoy?
1
Not at all

2
A little bit

3
Moderately

4
Quite a bit

5
Extremely

10. Feeling distant or cut off from other people?
1
Not at all

2
A little bit

3
Moderately

4
Quite a bit

5
Extremely

11. Feeling emotionally numb or being unable to have loving feelings for those close to you?
1
Not at all

2
A little bit

3
Moderately

4
Quite a bit

5
Extremely

12. Feeling as if your future will somehow be cut short?
1
Not at all

2
A little bit

3
Moderately

4
Quite a bit

5
Extremely

13. Trouble falling or staying asleep?
1
Not at all

2
A little bit

3
Moderately

4
Quite a bit

5
Extremely

14. Feeling irritable or having angry outbursts?
1
Not at all

2
A little bit

3
Moderately

4
Quite a bit

5
Extremely

15. Having difficulty concentrating?
1
Not at all

2
A little bit

3
Moderately

16. Being "super-alert" or watchful or on guard?

4
Quite a bit

5
Extremely
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1
Not at all

2
A little bit

3
Moderately

4
Quite a bit

5
Extremely

17. Feeling jumpy or easily startled?
1
Not at all

2
A little bit

3
Moderately

4
Quite a bit

5
Extremely
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Appendix C
Examples of Emotional Picture Comparisons
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Example of Rape-Positive Slides

Example of Rape-Negative Slides
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Example of Positive-Negative Slides

